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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN VINCENT TOONE,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

)
y

vs.
RUBY JOAN TOONE nka RUBY JOAN
PARKHURST,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
]
)

District Court No. 19707
Court of Appeals No. 960675A
Priority Classification 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter "Mrs. Parkhurst") submits the
following as her Brief of Appellant herein:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a2(h) (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order granting Mr. Toone's Motion
for Summary Judgment and denying Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment regarding Mrs. Parkhurst's Petition to Modify the
Decree of Divorce or Partition the Military Retirement benefits.
The order was entered by the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low of the
First Judicial District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, sitting
without a jury and hearing the case as a case of first impression
in Utah regarding the effects of McCarty.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in alluding

that the military retirement benefits had been silently adjudicated
to Mr. Toone when in reality the Decree of Divorce did not mention
the military retirement benefits; both parties stipulated that the
military retirement benefits had not been specifically or expressly
divided; McCarty forbade state courts from dividing or offsetting
military retirement in the divorce as a matter of law; and when
USFSPA overturned McCarty each former spouse became tenants-incommon to the retirement until a formal division occurs?
2*

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding

that the doctrine of res judicata was appropriate in this case
where the evidence indicated that the military retirement benefits
were not specifically mentioned in the Decree of Divorce, the trial
court had retained exclusive jurisdiction under the original Decree
as well as the Supplemental Decree to revise other property matters
under

the

Decree

of

Divorce,

and

USFSPA

specifically

allows

retroactive modification of divorces such as this one entered after
June 25, 1981?
2

3.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding

that the eight year statute of limitation barred Mrs. Parkhurst's
Petition to Modify where no ouster of the cotenants occurred; where
her

partition

action

is an

equitable

remedy

governed

by

the

equitable doctrine of laches and not the statute of limitation;
where USFSPA specifically granted retroactive treatment to reopen
decrees entered after June 25, 1981;

where the original Decree

retained jurisdiction and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was
not entered until December 16, 1983 and specifically reserved the
right to either party to file a motion to divide the marital
property after December 16, 1988; and where the parties became
tenants-in-common to the military retirement benefits under USFSPA,
creating a new claim and a substantial change in circumstances
governed by the courts continuing jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 3 0-35 (1995).
4.
equity

Did the trial court err by concluding that as a matter of
that

Mrs.

Parkhurst's

filing

of

the

partition

action

fourteen (14) years after entry of the first Decree of Divorce was
late and untimely where the lower court specifically ruled that
neither laches nor estoppel could bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim; where
the retirement had not been withdrawn and would not be disbursed
until May 3, 1998; and where, under the lower court's decision, Mr.
Toone would receive one hundred percent (100%) of the retirement
benefits, when the trial court obviously intended each party to
receive fifty percent (50%) of the marital estate?

3

5.

Did the trial court err by relying on the Throckmorton

case where Throckmorton involves a divorce in 1978 (not after June
25, 1981) ; is not a military retirement case; where Woodward, could
be

applied

to

this

divorce

since

judgment

was

entered

after

Woodward; and the facts make it totally distinguishable?
6.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying

Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment to divide the
military

benefits

when

legal

precedent

in

a

majority

of

jurisdictions permits division of military retirement post-divorce?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
The Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act

(USFSPA)

which is codified under 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (c) (1) (1990 as amended)
along with U.C.A. § 30-3-5 (1) & (3) (1995) maybe determinative of the
outcome of this appeal.
Brief

may

be

Also the cases cited by Appellant in this

determinative

of

the

outcome

in

this

appeal,

particularly since the majority of those cases hold that military
retirement benefits can be divided post-divorce where the divorce
was entered after June 25, 1981.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

standard

of

review

in

this

appeal

as

to

the

issue

presented on appeal is a "correctness standard" in reviewing the
trial

court's

Conclusions

of Law

in the application

of

legal

principles such as res judicata, statute of limitations, and the
substantial

change

in

circumstances
4

test

in

denying

Mrs.

Parkhurst's request where the review pays no deference to trial
courts holding.

See State Farm Fire Casualty Co. v. Grearv, 869

P.2d 952, 1954 (Ut. App. 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 936 (Utah
1994) .

The other standard of review is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in granting Mr. Toone's Motion for Summary
Judgment based solely on the affidavits before it, under principles
of equity

(such as partition, laches and estoppel),

since the

affidavits do not reveal harm to Mr. Toone or unreasonable delay by
Mrs. Parkhurst smd the trial court's decision was so unreasonable
in this area that it was arbitrary, capricious and a clear abuse of
discretion.

See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434-36

(Utah

1993) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an Order granting Mr. Toone's Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The Order was entered on September 25, 1996 in

the First Judicial District Court in and for Cache County, Utah, by
the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low.

(R.O.A. 23 9)

(Exhibit "E"

attached hereto).
The Order stemmed from the following procedural facts:

Lynn

Vincent Toone and Ruby Joan Toone were married on June 20, 1958 in
Manti, Utah.

(R.O.A. 239)

Mr. Toone began creditable time for

service in the Navy by working from March 1958 to the end of 1979
which qualified

him for full vesting of twenty

(20) years of

military service, some ten (10) years active duty and some eleven
5

(11) years in the Naval Reserve. (R.O.A. 240)

During all of Mr.

Toone's creditable time of military service the parties had been
married a total of twenty-three years
required by 10 U.S.C. § 1408].

[over ten

(R.O.A. 239-240)

(10) years as
Mrs. Toone (nka

Parkhurst) supported Mr. Toone and made it possible for him to
qualify for this retirement.

(R.O.A. 141-43)

On June 25, 1981,

the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981),
ruled that federal law preempted the application of state marital
property concepts to military retirement benefits and disallowed
state court authority to divide military retirement benefits in a
divorce.

When Mr. Toone filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on

or about June 22, 1981 (R.O.A. 1) and Mrs. Toone filed an Answer
and Counterclaim on or about June 29, 1981, (R.O.A. 4 ) , the McCartv
decision did not permit marital division of military retirement by
a

state

court.

The parties

agreed

to bifurcate

the

divorce

proceedings and permit Mr. Toone a divorce so he could remarry.
(R.O.A. 18)

The trial court granted Mr. Toone a bifurcated divorce

on July 23, 1981 and retained specific jurisdiction to divide all
other marital property at a later date. (R.O.A. 18) (See Exhibit
"A" paragraph 2 ) .
On July 9, 1982, the trial court held a trial on all other
reserved issues (except for the naval retirement) and made Findings
and an Order and asked Mr. Toone's attorney, Arden Lauritzen, to
prepare the final papers and to present the same for the judge's
signature. (R.O.A. 29-30) (Also see Exhibit "B" Trial Transcript).
On

September

2,

1983, Mr.

Toone
6

filed

a motion

for

Further

Proceedings

and

to

correct

exhibits

prior

to

Findings and Order to the court for signature.
court denied this request. (R.O.A. 38)

submitting

the

(R.O.A. 31)

The

Mr. Toone's attorney took

so long to file the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Decree of Divorce, that Mrs. Parkhurst's attorney finally prepared
the

Findings

and

submitted

Supplemental

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law together with a Supplemental Judgment and Decree
which were signed and dated December 14, 1983. (R.O.A. at 41 & 59)
Corrected

Supplemental

Findings

entered on December 16, 1983.

and

Judgment

and

Decree

were

(R.O.A. at 50 & 68) (See Exhibit "C"

for Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree).
The trial court specifically ruled in paragraph 6 of the
Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree
that

Mr. Toone's Utah

State nonmilitary

(hereafter
retirement

"Decree")
was

worth

approximately $10,000.00 and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah State retirement
was worth about $3,000.00.
Exhibit "C" paragraph 6) .

(R.O.A. 70 & 181 to 185)

(See also

The court offset these two (2) civil

retirements one against the other leaving

$7,000.00, which it

divided equally between the parties by granting $3,500.00 to Mrs.
Parkhurst.

(R.O.A. 70)

The affidavits, subsequent exhibits and

Findings and Decree show that the court dealt only with the civil
retirements of the parties and that the "navy" retirement was never
mentioned and was totally omitted from the trial court evidence as
well as the Findings and Decree. (R.O.A. 125, Exhibit "C" paragraph
10 of Decree).

7

In paragraph 4 of the Corrected Decree, the court retained
jurisdiction for a period of five (5) years at the expiration of
which time either party could file a motion with the court to
revise the due date on Mrs. Parkhurst's equitable lien against the
home which the court was allowing Mr. Toone to pay over a period of
twenty

(20) years and also reserved jurisdiction to revise any

other property matters. (R.O.A. 70)

Mr. Toone filed an objection

requiring the trial court to make sure either party could file
motions after the five (5) years expired.

(R.O.A. 78)

The trial

court interlineated in paragraph 4 of the Decree, the change which
allowed motions to be filed after the five

(5) years ended in

December of 1988. (R.O.A. 70) (Exhibit "C" paragraph 4; Exhibit M B"
page 7 ) .
Mrs.

Parkhurst

filed a Petition to Modify

the Decree

of

Divorce on or about October 23, 1995 to receive her one-half (M)
share of the naval retirement. (R.O.A. 106)
Answer on November 1, 1995. (R.O.A. 110)

Mr. Toone filed an

Mr. Toone then filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment on January 18, 1996 (R.O.A. 115), and
Mrs. Parkhurst filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on or
about February 1, 1996. (R.O.A. 144)
contained

in Mr.

Toone's

affidavit

The only sworn testimony is
(R.O.A.

Parkhurst's affidavits (R.O.A. 139 to 143).
Memorandum Decision

124-125)

and Mrs.

The court entered a

(R.O.A. 226, Exhibit "D") and Amended Order

(R.O.A. 239, Exhibit "E"), based on the parties Motions, denying
Mrs.

Parkhurst's

request

to

divide

8

the

naval

retirement

on

September 25, 1996.

Mrs. Parkhurst filed a Notice of Appeal on

October 15, 1996. (R.O.A. 246)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as
this appeal, both parties admit that the naval retirement benefits
were

not

Divorce.

specifically

divided

in the trial

court's

Decree of

Moreover, no oral discussion took place during trial or

written mention of military retirement benefits were made in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(See Affidavit of Lynn

Toone, paragraph 6 which states "The Decree of Divorce does not
specify an allocation of military retirement benefits between the
parties.")

(R.O.A. 125 and affidavit of Joan Parkhurst, page 2

R.O.A. 142; Exhibit "B", page 5, Exhibit "C" paragraph 10).
Both parties admit for purposes of this appeal that the only
retirements mentioned in the Decree of Divorce are Mr. Toone's
retirement of $10,000.00 from Utah State Retirement System and Mrs.
Parkhurst's

retirement

(R.O.A. 175 to 185) .

of

$3,000.00

at Utah

State

University.

The parties admit for purposes of this

appeal that only two (2) civil retirements were discussed in the
court's evidence and Findings.
Both parties acknowledge that the military retirement benefits
have not been withdrawn by Mr. Toone and he will not start to
receive those benefits until his 60th birthday on May 3, 1998.
(Affidavit

of Lynn Toone

(R.O.A.

9

125) and

facts presented

in

paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Response to Mrs. Parkhurst's Request for
Reconsideration R.O.A. 208, paragraph 6 ) .
Both parties also acknowledge that Mrs. Parkhurst was married
to Mr. Toone for twenty-three (23) years, that Mr. Toone worked for
the military retirement benefits for more than twenty years and
that those military retirement benefits were earned entirely during
the marriage

(except for 2 or 3 months in 1958).

(R.O.A. 208,

paragraph 6)
Both parties stipulate that Mrs. Parkhurst was awarded only
$1.00 per month as alimony in the Decree of Divorce and that no
alimony has been paid by Mr. Toone to Mrs. Parkhurst. (R.O.A. 70)
The parties basic disputed facts are over why Mrs. Parkhurst
waited so long to bring the action to divide the naval retirement
benefits.

Mr. Toone also contends that the naval retirement was

silently adjudicated by the trial court and awarded to Mr. Toone by
default although no written evidence supports this claim and Mrs.
Parkhurst flatly denies this claim.
The lower court ruled that estoppel and laches were not a bar
to Mrs. Parkhurst's claim since no harm has occurred to Mr. Toone
by

Mrs.

Parkhurst's

action

or

inaction.

(See Amended

Order

granting Summary Judgment, page 4 paragraph 3, Exhibit "E", R.O.A.
243).

It was undisputed that Mrs. Parkhurst did not learn of

USFSPA until 1995 and that she acted reasonably thereafter. (R.O.A.
232).

The lower court also agreed that if Mrs. Parkhurst had

brought her action earlier (i.e., within the eight-year statute of
limitation) that Mrs. Parkhurst may have had a legitimate claim if
10

she could avoid the principle of res judicata. (R.O.A. paragraph 1,
193; 226-227)
of

The main focus of the lower court was on the length

time which had passed

since the divorce order

and on the

doctrine of res judicata. (R.O.A. 226 to 239)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The issues presently before this Court are of first impression
in this state.

The main issue is whether military retirement,

expressly omitted from the Findings and Decree in a divorce decided
after June 25, 1981, can now be divided pursuant to USFSPA and
state law.
Mrs. Parkhurst's Brief will show the Court that Utah law,
prior to McCartv, allowed for the equitable division of pension
rights, retirement benefits, annuities and military
benefits.

retirement

But for McCarty, Utah case law would have permitted an

equitable division of the current military retirement before the
Court.

The lower court agreed. (R.O.A. 233)

However, because of

McCarty, the trial court could not consider, offset, or divide the
military retirement.

As a matter of law, the military retirement

was not adjudicated nor could it have been adjudicated.
issue the trial court erred.

Upon this

The trial transcript, Findings and

Decree all indicate that the marital property, including the civil
retirements, were divided 50/50 and no mention or reference was
made to the military retirement.
seeking

Res judicata does not bar Mrs.

Parkhurst

from

a division

benefits.

There are several cases which have decided that issue
11

of

the military

retirement

and

which

hold

that

because

McCarty

forbade

the

division

of

military retirement benefits by state courts and further forbade
any adjustment in the award of other community property to counterbalance or offset the loss of these benefits that res judicata
cannot apply.
Partition actions to divide military retirement benefits have
been

allowed

in

post

McCarty

divorce

decrees

which

did

not

expressly award the military retirement benefits to the service
member.

Omission of certain property from a decree of divorce does

not affect

the divorce's

finality.

It merely means

that the

omitted property is to be held by the former spouses as tenants in
common since it was not formally divided by the court.

Partition

is and has always been available as a means of dividing property
not formally divided upon divorce.
Only if the divorce court -\had specifically adjudicated or
expressly

stated

in

the

decree

a division

of

the

retirement

benefits would res judicata bar a subsequent suit for partition of
the military retirement benefits in this case.

The judgment is res

judicata only to present and not future conditions.

Because the

enactment of USFSPA created a new fact and a change in the law, a
new cause of action arose.

This was a future condition to which

res judicata does not apply.
Nor

can Mrs. Parkhurst's

statute of limitations.

claim be denied because

of the

The statute of limitation defense is not

applicable for several reasons.

12

First, this is a partition action against military benefits
which were omitted from the Decree.

Because USFSPA overturned the

McCartv decision, t lit." retirement benefits here reverted to the
parties as tenants in common for which no disposition was made,
thus giving the partitioners the right to divide this property at
any time.

The trial court erroneously thought it stayed in Mr.

Toone's ownership only.
For the statute of limitations to begin to run in a partition
action, there must first be an ouster of one tenant against the
other.

Neither party had been ousted by court

federal benefit, which arguably
ruling.

:u-i

* lis

Coin unly be divided r

a court

Since there was no ouster and no division of the property,

each party remained in possession of their rights t

miliary

benefits until somco'iit.: began an action to do otherwise.

The trial

court erroneously held the limitations began to run on December 16,
1983 or February 1, 1983.
Second, the statute of limitation is a legal defense used
against legal remedies.

Divorce courts and partition actions are

equitable remedies and it wns inappropriate for the court to use
the legal defense of a eight-year statute of limitation to bar Mrs.
Parkhurst's claim as mentioned in the above paragraph.

Mr. Toone

could only assert the defense of laches in this case.

Laches is

not appropriate in this case as will be shown below and the trial
court acknowledged this.
Third,

provisions

of

USFSPA

specifically

allow

parties

retroactive benefits in divorce cases that happen after June 25,
13

1981 particularly when there is a specific reservation, as in this
case, for a later property division.

The Decree of Divorce also

reserved jurisdiction to permit later property divisions which
reservations preclude the use of the statute of limitations to bar
this claim.
Lastly, the court has continuing jurisdiction under U.C.A. §
30-3-5 on new issues to make new orders.

There is no statute of

limitations for such continuing jurisdiction. A substantial change
in circumstances allows reopening of the Decree.
USFSPA

and

Woodward,

both

created

a

The enactment of

substantial

change

in

circumstances when other facts are considered herein.
For the defense of laches to apply, there must be a lack of
diligence on the part of Mrs. Parkhurst and resulting injury to Mr.
Toone.

Equity does not encourage laches, and the doctrine may not

be invoked to defeat justice bufr only to prevent injustice.

The

equitable defense of laches would only be available to prevent
unfairness to a spouse who may have spent the money in reliance on
the judgment.

However, that is not the case here since the money

has not yet been received by either party and will not be received
until 1998. Furthermore, knowledge of the enactment of USFSPA, may
not be imputed to Mrs. Parkhurst.
be imputed.

That is a "new fact" that cannot

It created new evidence to divide retirement.

this issue the trial court erred.

Upon

Rather, the delay must be

unreasonable under the circumstances, including the party's actual
subjective knowledge of her right, and it must be shown that any
change in the circumstances caused by the delay has resulted in
14

prejudice l-

Mr

Toone sufficient to justify denial of relief.

Courts have held that the critical date upon which

» base laches

or statute of liir: .:' l-;.,s Is when the wife first gained actual
knowledge

of

.;-.-. rights under USFSPA.

learning about her rights under USFSPA
Petition.

Mrs. Parkhurst,

after

i :* < : imely and filed her

When one considers the evidence

in the light most

favorable to Mrs. Parkhurst, the trial court abused its discretion
in holding against her.
Utah case law prior to the McCarty Decision made it clear that
the general rule as established in Englert v. Englert, 576 P. 2d
1274

(Utah 1978) was that the trial court's duty is to make an

equitable

division

of

property

in

a

divorce

action

which

"encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the
parties, whenev ei obtained ai id from whatever source derived; and
that this includes any such pension fund or insurance. "

Id. at

1276.
The retirement benefits in this case were fully vested prior
to the date of divorce.

Mr. Toone had served over twenty (20)

years in the military naval retirement system.
been married for twenty-three

(23) years.

The parties had

Federal law permits

division of retirements in those cases and have set up a procedure
for so doing under USFSPA.

Utah law not only allowed for the

division of such property but also found creative ways for insuring
that the other spouse received equitable treatment if one party did
receive all of the retirement, such as lump sum alimony awards,
survivor annuity benefits, larger alimony payments, claim upon the
15

other spouse's estate upon death, and various other methods.

More

recent Utah cases indicate that waiting until the retirement is
actually distributed and entering an order dividing the same at
that time might even be more equitable.

In this case, the trial

court in 1982 could have easily ruled that once the retirement
annuity payments began each party would receive fifty percent (50%)
of that annuity payment.
However, because of the ruling in McCarty, the trial court had
no authority or jurisdiction to divide the military retirement or
to offset it against other marital property.
from

the trial court's

military retirement.

findings

that

It is also evident

it did not consider the

Mrs. Parkhurst did not receive extra alimony

or other extra property to offset the military retirement benefits
of Mr. Toone.
matter.
been

The trial court decision was in error on this

Because McCarty has now been overturned and USFSPA has

enacted

to

permit

retroactive

adjustments

to

avoid

the

inequities caused by McCarty it is not only fair and equitable for
the court to divide the same but justice requires it.
Obviously,

because

the

trial

court

divided

all

marital

property 50/50 and did not take into consideration the military
retirement benefit or provide any offsets or adjustments for those
military retirement benefits, an injustice will result if Mr. Toone
were to receive one hundred percent (100%) of those benefits. Mrs.
Parkhurst is asking that she receive fifty percent (50%) of those
benefits, not all of them.
Mrs.

Parkhurst's Motion

The trial court's decision in denying

for Summary Judgment, however, and in
16

granting Mi

Toone's Summary Judgment Motion effectively gives Mr.

Toone an unintended windfall to one hundred percent (100%) of those
benefits

without

USFSPA, and ail of

^-.:sr' ••":'. o:

ffset

to

Mrs

Parkhurst.

:.--. iaws surrounding these issues make it clear

that the court should lean towards creating equit:\ rathei ohan an
injustice and that courts should find a way to treat both parties
fairly rather than find ways to block Mrs. Parkhurst's Petition
legal theories of res judicata and statue of limitations.

It was

err for the trial court to foreclose Mrs. Parkhurst's ability to
receive her share of the retirement funds,

LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE P R I N C I P L E 0 F
"RES JUDICATA" BARRED APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A DIVISION OF
THE NAVAL RETIREMENT WHERE THE NAVAL RETIREMENT WAS NOT
EXPRESSLY ADJUDICATED BY THE TRIAL COURT, NOR COULD IT
HAVE BEEN UNDER THE DECISION OF MCCARTY, AND WHERE THE
LATER ENACTING OF (USFSPA) ELIMINATED THE HORRORS CAUSED
BY MCCARTY, AND SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED THAT DIVORCES
OCCURRING AFTER JUNE 25, 1981 COULD BE REOPENED TO ALLOW
FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO MODIFY OR
DIVIDE MILITARY RETIREMENT.

The

doctrine

of

res

judicata

is

applicable

only

in

the

following situations:
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata
as to those issues which were either (1) tried and determined, or
(2) upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to
present and have determined in the other proceeding.
v. Throckmorton,

Throckmorton

123 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).

However,

in order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, both the prior
claim and the current claim must meet three requirements:
17

1.
Both actions must involve the same parties, their
prievies, or their assignees;
2. The claim that is asserted to be barred must have been
presented or be such that it could have been presented in the
first case; and
3.
The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Fitzgerald
v. Corvit, 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990).
In the present case item one was met but items 2 and 3 were
not.

Item 2 was not met because the trial court could not divide

the military retirement since McCarty v. McCarty, 453 US 210 (1981)
held

that

federal

law precluded

a

state

court

from

dividing

military retirement pay pursuant to state property laws, or even
using

it to offset property

in the divorce.

Jd. at

22 9 and

Hisguierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588 (1979) .
If McCarty precluded the trial court from even hearing the
matter or allowing a party to bring the matter before it, then
there was no way Mrs. Parkhurst could have had a fair opportunity
to present and have determined that issue in the first trial.

Both

parties stipulate and agree that the issue was not presented to the
court and the only question is whether by silence it was awarded to
Mr. Toone by default.
Several cases since McCarty have held that res judicata does
not bar a partition suit brought by a former spouse of a service
member to obtain a division of the military retirement benefits.
McCarty rests on the premise that the purpose of the statute that
created military retirement would be frustrated if state courts
were

allowed

to divide the retirement

in divorce proceedings.

Thus, to prevent this result, the Supreme Court held that the
18

federal statute superseded state property laws that allowed for the
division of military retirements.
federal

statute would

allowed

to

property.

offset

Surely, the purpose

the

also be frustrated if a state court was

military

retirement

against

other

marital

Accordingly, because the trial court wae silent :m the

treatment of the military retirement benefits, Mr. Toone cannot now
argue that Mrs. Parkhurst somehow received additional property as
an offset against the military retirement: benefits.
In addition, res judicata does not apply because USFSPA, the
cause of action that allowed a spouse to seek a division of the
military retirement a ::coi int, d i d not: exi st: a t t h e t i m e
divorce.

of the

Res judicata only bars claims that were or could have

been brought during the first case, not to future conditions or
future claims.
One oi the better cases to" decide thi.- issue is Powell v.
Powell, 703 S.W.2d 434

(Texas App, 1985)

Powell the coi n t

dealt with a divorce in 1965 that was silent as to any division of
the military retirement pay.

The wife brought suit in 1979 seeking

a judgment for 46% of the retirement.

Thus, the wife (as in our

case) waited fourteen years after the divorce to seek part of the
military retirement pay.

The trial court entered judgment for the

wife for 46% of all retirement benefits and the husband appealed
arguing res judicata.

The appellate court followed McCarty and

ruled that the wife was not entitled to anything.

On February 1,

1983, USFSPA was enacted and on April 7, 1983 the wife again filed
for one-half (M) of the military retirement seeking a declaratory
19

judgment.

The husband again asserted the defense of res judicata

and argued that the wife was not entitled to one-half

(M) of the

military pay because it was not earned in a community property
state, and the trial court took into account the military benefits
in dividing the property and setting child support payments in the
original decree.

This time the trial court found that wife was

entitled to 46% of the military retirement benefits, so the husband
appealed again.

The Powell court specifically held:

Res judicata will operate as a bar only to matters
actually raised or that could have been raised in the
previous litigation.
As to matters which arise
subsequently, the prior judgment will not be res
judicata. Our Supreme Court expresses the rule thusly:
'The judgment is res judicata only of present and not
future conditions' . - . (citations omitted)
The enactment by congress of the FSPA created a new fact,
a change in the law and a new cause of action. See also
Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368; State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co. v. Duel, 327 U.S. 154; U.S. v. Lubbock Ind. Sch.
Dist. . 455 F.Supp. 1223; and-Colorado Co. FED. S&L Assn.
v. Lewis CCA, 498 S.W.2d 723. Id. at 436
Powell also held regarding the argument on community
property vs. common law property at page 437:
"We
recognize
that property
acquired
in common
law
jurisdictions has historically been termed separate property,
but we hold that the property spouses acquire during marriage,
except by gift, devise or descend should be divided upon
divorce in Texas in the same manner as community property,
irrespective of the domicile of the spouses where they acquire
the property. Id. at 437.
Utah would agree with this statement because it too divides
all marital property acquired during marriage, regardless of whose
name it was titled in or from what state it originated.
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Regarding the Defendant's argument that other marital property
and support was offset against the military retirement, the Powell
court stated:
"Appellant contends in his defense that the trial court
took the military retirement benefits into consideration
when dividing the parties' property and fixing child
support payments cannot be adjudicated here by Summary
Judgment. The military retired pay was not divided or
mentioned in or by the divorce decree of 1965. Thus, the
husband and wife became joint owners thereof." _Id. at
437.
Several cases, in addition to Powell, have held that res
judicata is not a bar to a former spouse seeking one-half
the retirement benefits.

(M) of

See generally Eddie v. Eddie, 7

-.2d

783 (Texas 1986); Marino v. Alejandro, Jr., 775 S.W.2d 735 (Texas
1989); Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W,2d 299 (Texas 1987); (wherein the
court

held

that

the

doctrine

nl

" judicata

did

not

bar a

partition suit despite language in the Divorce Decree that stated
"all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted herein
is hereby denied" L>

f iu^

die Decree did not expressly award the

military retirement benefits to the service member);
Thompson, 720 P.2d

921

(Cal. 1986)

Casas v.

(where, eleven years after

divorce, wife is allowed to divide retirement that was silent in
the Decree).
The only cases which have permitted res judicata to bar an
action for partition

have been those where the court expressly

awarded the military retirement benefits in the divorce decree.
In the present case, the trial court did not expressly mention
the military retirement benefits in the Decree of Divorce.
21

The

divorce trial fits squarely within the time period after June 25,
1981

(i.e.,

July

23,

1981

and

July

9,

1982).

The

federal

legislation made USFSPA retroactive to June 25, 1981. The property
was not adjudicated and it remains in both parties as tenants in
common.
Regarding item 3 - whether there was a final judgment on the
merits over the military retirement, there was not.

The trial

court specifically reserved jurisdiction to divide marital property
later.

Because of McCartyf the military retirement was initially

treated as separate property of Mr. Toone but with the enactment of
USFSPA on February 1, 1983, the effects of McCartv were eliminated
and

the

retirement

became

marital

property

once

again.

The

military retirement therefore was never divided by a final order of
the court.

Omission of certain property does not

affect

the

finality of the Order as to property adjudicated, but on property
not adjudicated, it remains held as tenants in common.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING THE
EIGHT-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR APPELLANT'S
CLAIM FOR A DIVISION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT.

The defense of statute of limitations is not applicable to
this case, for several reasons:
A.

The former spouses are tenants in common to the
retirement, no judgment was entered on its
division and no ouster has occurred.

Because the divorce court failed to divide the retirement, it
remains marital property and is held as tenants in common.

Several

cases have decided the issue of omitted property in a decree of
22

divorce arid V w

Hie property

is held after the divorce.

The

majority, including Utah, have held that omitted property remains
titled in both parties as tenai."
v. Cooper, c,

J

See generally Cooper

..-.:.: ...j-i vAriz. Apt . ; •_? v

P.2d 1175 (Idaho 1992);

Mosier v. Mosier, 830

Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W.2d (Texas 1987);

Henn v. Henn, 6 05 P.2d

);

lverson v. Iverson, 526

P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974) (where the court found the parties who were
previously joint tenants in a family home which the court did not
fully divide would now become tenants in common to said home) ; see
also Booth v. Booth, 722 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986) (similar holding).
.. Obviously, if the parties could not adjudicate- ' he pr operty
and

the property

w i, n 1 expressly

divided

in the

Divorce, they must remain as tenants in common r

Decree

of

the property

since it was a marital asset that W H S iointly uwned during the
marriage,

Before the statute of* limitations or laches begins to

run in a situation where both parties are tenants in common to the
property, one party must oust the other one

?\i I ouster requires

open, clear and hostile speech or acts that show a clear intent to
exclude

the other cotenant

from the property.

See Massey v.

Protagro, 664 P. 2d 1176 (Utah 1983) (where the tax title statute of
limitations and adverse possession limitation of seven years did
not run against cotenant until other cotenant was ousted, merely
waiting twenty (20) years or even ten

. -ars after tax sale was

not enough).
Mr. Toone, who has the burden to show an ouster, has proffered
no evidence that an ouster ever occurred in this case.
23

The trial

court erroneously held that the limitations began on final divorce
or when USFSPA was enacted in February 1983 . This was error since
no

ouster

can take place

by passage

nondistribution in a divorce decree.

of a

law or by

silent,

Ouster requires much more as

stated above.
B.
Because

Statute of limitations is a legal defense and not
applicable to this equitable claim.
the

retirement

is

held

as

tenants

in

common,

partition action is appropriate to divide the property.
actions

are equitable proceedings.

a

Partition

Likewise, the division of

property in Utah in a divorce case is an equitable determination.
Consequently, only equitable defenses are available to bar Mrs.
Parkhurst's

claim.

limitations,

do

Legal
not

defenses,
apply

to

like

the

statute

equitable

of

claims.

The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense which
arises in cases where the^ plaintiff seeks equitable
relief. A defendant may successfully assert this defense
when a plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in
bringing an action and this delay prejudices the
defendant.
However, where the plaintiff's claims are
based in law, the statute of limitations, not the
doctrine of laches, governs the timing surrounding a
plaintiff's filing of a complaint. See Doit, Inc. v.
Touche, Ross & Company, 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996)
Likewise, the doctrine of 1 aches, not statute of limitations,
applies as a defense against the equitable claim of partition of
the retirement.

Otherwise, none of the ex-spouses in cases

such as

Henn, Casas, Powell, Id. (all from eleven to fourteen years after
divorce) could have reopened the decree.
C.

Statute of limitations is not applicable because Congress
expressly made USFSPA retroactive to June 25, 1981 by
Amendment in November 1990.
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Several
USFSPA.

cases

have

challenged

the

retroactive

effect

of

In the majority, if not all of those decisions, the court

has held that Congress intended that IJSFSP-' ippi y • et roactively.
See generally In re: Marriage of Barnes, 743 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1987),
and cases cited therein.

The committee report accompanying the

measure on USFSPA says:
The purpose of this provision is to place the courts in
the same position that they were in on June 26, 1981, the
date of the McCarty decision, with respect to treatment
of nondisability military retired or retainer pay. The
provision is intended to remove the federal presumption
found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and
permit state and other courts of competent jurisdiction
to apply pertinent state or other laws in determining
whether military retired or retainer pay should be
divisible.
S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong. , 2d Sess. 16 (1982), 1:1555,

1611.

injustice'

" [T]he
of

the

states

situation

interest

in

and

achieving

in

*

remedying
an

the

'rank

equitable

dissolution of the marita1 relationshi p justi fies such ] : e11 oactive
application."

In re Marriage of Barnes, 743 P.2d 915 at page 918

(Cal. 1987) . Congress amended § 1408(c) of USFSPA in November 1990
to clarify that point and t » ill<>w lur modification back to June
25, 1981.

Because of the intended retroactive application, the

statute of limitations cannot bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim.
D.

The original Decree of Divorce reserved jurisdiction to
decide future splits of property between the parties and
that reservation avoids the statute of limitations
problem.

The Decree of Divorce dated July 23, 1981 states in paragraph
2: "The court herein makes no order in respect to custody, child
support or division

property and that jurisdiction is retained
25

by the court to consider said matters at a later date."
specific

reservation

in

the

Decree

retains

by

court

This
order

jurisdiction to consider division of any property at a later date.
The statute of limitations cannot apply to such an order.
order would

cover the military retirement benefits

This

since that

division of property has not yet taken place and jurisdiction was
specifically reserved for it.
§

1408

indicates

that

a

Section (c) (1) (B) of 10

spouse

could

even

seek

U.S.C.

division

retirement before June 25, 1981 decrees if the divorce

of

decree

reserved jurisdiction to treat any amount of the retired pay of the
member as property of the member and the member spouse or former
spouse.

The

trial

court

also

reserved

jurisdiction

in

the

Corrected Decree dated December 16, 1983, specifically at paragraph
4 it states: "The court retains jurisdiction for a period of five
(5) years at the expiration of which time either party may motion
the court to revise due date of the loan or other property matters
herein."
cover

This reservation of jurisdiction by the trial court would

any

adjudicated,

property

that

and would

the

Corrected

Judgment

allow Mrs. Parkhurst

to

and

file

Decree

a motion

sometime after the expiration of five (5) years to deal with other
property matters.

Arguably, Mrs. Parkhurst's motion to partition

the retirement filed in October 1995 was within the eight (8) year
statute of limitations, if one was to be applied, because the five
(5) years ended in December of 1988.
Under either reservation of jurisdiction above, the court
would have the authority to take another look at and divide the
26

military retirement, thus, omitting it from,, the operation of the
statute of limitations and the cutoff provisions in USFSPA and
leaving that issue open to be 1 itigated by (lie parties.
E.

The court has continuing jurisdiction to review property
matters in Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-5 and the statute of
limitations is not applicable in such situations.

Utah

law

pi ov :i des

tl lat

a

divorce

court

"has

continuing

jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support in maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and

their

support

distribution

of

maintenance,

the property

reasonable and necessary."

health,

dental

and obligations

Ut

care,

or

for debts

I! 30-3-5(3)

the

as is

(1953 as

amended) (emphasis added).
Other courts have also ruled that if there are marital assets
which were not disposed

iecree, tlleiI tlle court has

continuing equitable power to divide those assets. See Elsworth v.
Elsworth, 423 P.2d 364, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. ] 967); In re: Marriage
of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976); Cribbee v. McDermott, 521 P.2d
1023

(Idaho 1974); Harris v. Harris, 493 P.2d 407

(N.M. 1972);

Pittmann v. Pittmann, 393 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1964).
The proper treatment of undisclosed and unlitigated property
is that both parties become tenants in common of the property until
the court can determine how the property is to be divided.
that

§

30-3-5

of

*

T

^\' Code

allows

the

court

Note

continuing

jurisdiction to make "new orders" which we are asking the court to
do in this case since McCartv created a new cause of action for
Mrs. Parkhurst and she seeks a new order regarding the retirement.
27

Utah law further recognizes the court's authority to correct
judgments at any time based on error or omission.
60 (a) .

Other

states

have

likewise

Utah R. Civ. P.

recognized

the

theory

of

correction of a judgment to allow the court, where a husband's
pension was omitted from the original findings and decree, to make
a correction at any time.

See In re the Marriage of Getz, 789 P. 2d

331 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) based on a statute permitting correction
of clerical errors under Rule 60 (a) which is very similar to the
Utah rule.
mistakes

According to Getz, the rule provides that "clerical

in judgments

. . . and

errors

therein

arising

oversight or omission may be corrected at any time . . . .
332 (emphasis omitted).
in judgments

from

Getz at

Utah's Rule 60(a) reads "clerical mistakes

. . . arising from oversight or omission may be

corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative

..."

In Getz, the husband had two pensions, one state plan and one
national plan, which was disclosed during discovery to the wife.
The decree of divorce was later issued, dividing the assets of the
state plan but was silent as to the national retirement plan.

Wife

requested a Nunc Pro Tunc order to modify the decree to include the
national plan.

The court found that the parties had intended to

divide their assets and that the trial judge intended to divide all
assets

and

allowed

the division of the national plan

Nunc Pro Tunc order.

through

the

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court, at the time in which this divorce was
granted,

clearly

jurisdiction

to

recognized
make

the

changes

to
28

trial

court's

orders

regarding

continuing
property

distribution, including modifying a spouse's interest in property
consisting of a stream of payments and income which the parties had
not yet received.

In Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah

198 3), the court stated that "§ 30-3-5 does authorize the divorce
court to reallocate property rights between the parties l

the

divorce, such as by modifying the earlier decree as to the parties
interest in the Big Bear property, including installment payments
not yet received."

Id. at 186.

Likewise, in this cast, retirement payments have not yet been
received but soon will and the court can examine how to equitably
divide this future stream of payments between the parties despite
any contention regarding statute of limitations or a lapse of time
since the decree of divorce.
Mrs.

Parkhurst

substantial

change

will
in

also

show

that

circumstances

has

occurred

to

a

permit

reopening of the Decree.

III. LACHES CANNOT BE A DEFENSE IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT SO HELD AND NO HARM HAS OCCURRED TO MR TOONE.
The trial court in Mrs. Parkhurst case ruled that laches and
estoppel
Judgment,

were
page

not
4

applicable
paragraph

(see

3)

but

Amended
then

Order

used

on

Summary

equitable

type

arguments (similar to laches) to bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim.

This

was err for several reasons.
To make out a defense of laches, the plaintiff must show (1)
that the defendant unreasonably delayed in bringing the action and
(2) that

the plaintiff

was prejudiced
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by

the delay.

Bruer-

Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 726 (Utah App. 1990) .
mere delay in time will not constitute laches.

A

Therefore, even

though the delay may be inexcusable and of a long duration (i.e.,
even

exceeding

the

statute

of

limitations),

if

there

is

no

prejudice to the other party that has issued from the mere passage
of time then laches would not be a bar.

In fact, for the doctrine

of laches to apply to a suit for the partition of personal property
such as military retirement

pay, there must be evidence of a

repudiation of the partitioning cotenant's interest in the property
by the other cotenant.

See Bankston v. Taft, 612 SW 2d 216

(Texas).
In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P. 2d 528 (Utah 1943) , it was held
that mere delay is not enough.
knowledge of essential facts.

One critical element of laches is
In Openshaw, the Utah Supreme Court

stated that laches cannot be imputed to one who was ignorant of the
facts and for that reason failed to assert his rights. Jd. at 531.
Laches requires subjective, actual knowledge.

It was error for the

trial court to impute knowledge of USFSPA to Mrs. Parkhurst, when
she had no actual knowledge of it.
In

addition,

laches

requires

an

unreasonable

commencing an action after obtaining actual knowledge.
above, a mere lapse of time is not enough.

delay

in

As stated

There must be evidence

that Mrs. Parkhurst actually delayed filing for partition, after
actually learning she could do so which delay was inexcusable.

The

only evidence presented was that Mrs. Parkhurst filed her claim
soon after learning of her rights under USFSPA.
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Finally, loi 1 lie defense of laches to bar an action, there
must be damage to Mr. Toone resulting from the unreasonable delay.
As stated in Openshaw:
Laches is more than a mere lapse of time, its essence is
estoppel. While delay is an important factor, yet mere
delay, unless unreasonable or inexcusable, is not enough;
and of an equal importance are the circumstances
occurring during the delay, the relationship of the
parties to the subject, disadvantages, that may have come
through loss of evidence, change of title, intervention
of equities, or injury from other causes. Id.
Cases involving military retirement pay and laches have made
it clear that laches does not apply to retirement benefits that
will be received prospectively because there is no prejudice to the
service member.

The service member has no right to control the

retirement until it is received ana z--.
their property interest.

•,,anjiot assign or transfer

The court in Beltran v. Razo, 788 P.2d

1256 (Ariz. App. 1990), so held.

Another case decided subsequent

to Beltran is Flynn v. Rogers, 834 I1, ci i in (Ail/ , 1992).

In

Flynn, the husband had retired from the military and was collecting
retirement at the time the couple divorced.
a

friend

enactment.

about
She

USFSPA
then

retirement benefits.

six and
filed

for

one-half

(6M) years

a partition

of

the

after

its

military

The court found that USFSPA created a new

fact and the passage of the law should
purposes of laches.

The wife was told by

imputed to her for

Consequently, the court found that laches did

not bar her claim to a retroactive award of $35,00u.00 +-h«r-

,

already been received by her ex-husband and was not a defense at
all to a prospective claim to future retirement benefits.
court reasoned as follows:
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The

Here, by contrast, the wife did not learn of any such
'fact' after the filing of the dissolution decree.
Assuming that the 'fact' giving rise to the wife's claim
was the husband's receipt of pension benefits, the wife
had knowledge of that fact before the decree was entered,
at which time, under McCarty, she had no claim. On the
other hand, if the inception of rights flowing from the
enactment of FSPA could possibly be considered a x fact',
then laches should not defeat her claim because the trial
court found, upon consideration of the evidence, that she
had no knowledge of that xfact' until shortly before the
commencement of this proceeding. JEd. at 153.
The court found that the wife's prior knowledge of the 'fact'
of the husband's receipt of military pension benefits could not,
and did not, give rise to a claim on her part.

Rather, her claim

evolved from rights created by the passage of USFSPA, and the trial
court found that she had no knowledge of those rights until shortly
before she commenced the proceeding.

In Flynn the court refused to

impute knowledge to the wife or state that her ignorance of the law
was inexcusable.
As the court stated in Beltran v. Razo, 788 P. 2d 1256, (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1990) , "equity does not encourage laches, and the doctrine
may

not

be

invoked

to

defeat

justice

but

only

to

prevent

injustice." Id. at 1258.
In the present case, Mr. Toone has not received or spent any
of the retirement benefits.
1998.

They are not due to be received until

Laches cannot be used as an argument to stop Mrs. Parkhurst

from receiving her entitled one-half (M) share to these retirement
benefits.

There has been no injustice created to Mr. Toone and

justice demands that Mrs. Parkhurst receive her fair share of these
retirement benefits.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NO CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED JUSTIFYING REOPENING THE DECREE
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY RETAINED JURISDICTION
TO DIVIDE THE MARITAL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE AT A LATER
DATE, HAD CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO DO SO BY STATUTE,
AND A NEW CLAIM AROSE BECAUSE OF THE ENACTMENT OF USFSPA
WHICH WAS CLEARLY A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE CREATED BY
STATUTORY ENACTMENT.

This Court's holding in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P. 2d
121 (Utah App. Court 1988), can clearly be distinguished from the
instant case because a substantial change in circumstances can be
shown, thus permitting the court to reopen the divorce and divide
the military retirement.
The Court's decision in Throckmorton, cited by Mr. Toone as
authority for granting Mr. Toone's motion for summary judgment, was
based on an entirely different legal claim and set of circumstances
which have substantial.factual distinction from the instant case.
Throckmorton involved parties who divorced in September 1976,
five (5) years before the effective date of USFSPA and therefore
clearly outside of the gap period created by McCarty.

In the

present case, the divorce was granted after the effective date of
June 25, 1981 created by USFSPA and is given retroactive effect by
USFSPA to that time.
Throckmorton also involved a request to modify 1976 divorce
decree, regarding a pension fund upon which the divorce decree was
silent, on the main theory that a subsequent change in law by
Woodward

v.

Woodward,

656

P.2d

431

"substantial change in circumstances".

(Utah

1982)

created

a

The Court in Throckmorton

relied heavily, if not entirely, on the principle that Woodward
would

not

have

retroactive

effect
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and

could

only

be

applied

prospectively and therefore could not constitute a substantial
change in circumstances to divorces prior to Woodward.

However, in

Mrs. Parkhurst's case, the divorce decree was actually finalized in
December

1983,

after

Woodward

became

law,

and

therefore

a

substantial change in circumstances could be created by Woodward as
well as USFSPA allowing this court to retroactively adjust the
military retirement benefits.

Congress clearly intended to create

a new cause of action for cases that fell after June 25, 1981.
Throckmorton also held "that the legal recognition of a new
category of property rights after a decree of divorce has been
entered, is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change
in circumstances justifying a re-evaluation of the prior property
division", but did not restrict itself if other facts that would
also indicate that a substantial change in circumstances exist.
See Throckmorton at 124.

In Throckmorton, the court found that

under the totality of the circumstances, the property distribution
does

not

offend

our

sense

of

justice.

.Id.

at

124.

Mr.

Throckmorton was ordered to pay $12,000.00 in marital debt in the
original decree, and Mrs. Throckmorton was awarded the family home
and ultimately received $24,000.00 in equity and had her alimony
increased.

In addition, the trial court in Throckmorton found that

the former spouse had an opportunity to litigate retirement issues
during the first proceeding.

After looking at the totality of the

circumstances, Throckmorton decided there was no substantial change
in circumstances.

Id. 123
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However,

Mrs.

Parkhurst,

in

the

current

case,

had

no

opportunity to litigate the division of the military retirement at
the first trial.

Furthermore, because the trial court in Mrs.

Parkhurst's case divided all other martial property 50/50, she
received no offsetting child support or alimony, and due to the
recognition of a new category of property rights by USFSPA and the
windfall

that Mr. Toone would receive

hundred percent
substantial

if he were allowed

one

(100%) of those military retirement benefits a

change

of

circumstances

does exist

justifying

the

reopening of the decree.
Lastly, Throckmorton as well as Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P. 2d 713
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), which followed Throckmorton were both based
on divorce cases involving omitted retirement benefits for divorces
granted prior to 1981 (i.e., Throckmorton 1976 and Ostler 1978) and
did

not

involve

military

retirement,

which

was

specifically

excluded by McCarty from being considered in the divorce.
stated in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d

835

As

(Utah Ct. App.

1995), the divorce court is to consider all marital property when
making

an

equitable

distribution

unless

the

law

specifically

prevents the court from considering a particular asset.
837.

Id. at

Because the retirement funds in Throckmorton and Ostler could

have been considered by the trial court and no law prevented their
consideration, the court specifically found that the matters were
res judicata.

However, in Mrs. Parkhurst's case, federal law and

the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of that law in McCarty
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specifically

prevented

the

trial

court

from

considering

the

military retirement.
In Mrs. Parkhurst's case, the military retirement was not
previously litigated or incorporated in the Decree and she can now
attack the original Decree and seek a new order regarding the same.

V.

THE NAVAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT EARNED DURING THE MARRIAGE
FROM MARCH, 1958 THROUGH THE END OF 1979 IS CONSIDERED
MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER UTAH LAW AND CAPABLE OF DIVISION
DURING THE DIVORCE TRIAL IN JULY OF 1982 WERE IT NOT FOR
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN MCCARTY, WHICH STATED
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTED APPLICATION OF STATE MARITAL
PROPERTY CONCEPTS TO MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

USFSPA 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1), provides in part:
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court
may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member for
pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as
property solely of the member or as property of the
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction of such court.
This provision specifically provides that a court may treat the
retired pay as property of the member and the former spouse for all
divorces occurring after June 25, 1981, in accordance with the law
of the jurisdiction of the court. The status of Utah law regarding
the division

of

retirement

on June

25, 1981

is

found

in the

Encrlert, Bennett, and Dogu decisions which defined the divisibility
of retirement prior to Woodward.
The Utah Supreme Court in Encrlert v. Encrlert, 576 P. 2d 1274
(Utah 1978), defined retirement benefits to be included under § 303-5 and divisible by the courts. Jd. at 1276.

The defendant in

that case argued that his veterans retirement fund was not property
within the meaning of the statute and should not be considered in
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the property divis ion.

Id. at 1275.

Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347

The defendant cited In re:

(Colo. App. 1975), where the

Colorado Court of Appeals held: "that the husband's army retirement
pension and future retired pay to be received thereunder do not
constitute "property" and are, therefore, not subject to division
under the Colorado statute."
that

since

Utah was

not

Defendant also argued in that case

a community

property

state

and

only

community property states had recognized military retirement funds
and pensions which
division.

accrued

during the marriage

as subject

to

Accordingly, defendant said that Utah should not uphold

the rulings in the community property states.

JEd. 1275-76.

However, the Utah Supreme Court in Englert defined § 30-3-5,
which states "when a decree of divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable",
to contain general terms and no hint of a limitation.

The court

said:
The import of our decisions implementing that statute is
that proceedings in regard to the family are equitable in
a high degree; and that the court may take into
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. It is
our opinion that the correct view under our law is that
this encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such
pension fund or insurance.
Id. at 1276.
Utah law recognized in Englert that the military retirement
benefits provided by the Veterans Hospital were a divisible asset

37

under Utah law and followed the position of community property
states who held likewise.
In Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 839

(Utah 1980), the Utah

Supreme Court also considered the division of a husband's military
retirement fund contributed by the federal government while he was
employed at Hill Air Force Base.

In Bennett, a civilian personnel

officer testified at the time of the divorce hearing that the
present value of the husband's retirement fund was $15,681.95. She
further stated that the federal government had contributed the same
amount to his retirement fund but that no present value could be
assigned to that portion.

Id. at 840.

The court followed the

language in Englert and divided the husbatid's contributions to his
retirement, but held that because the contributions by the federal
government had no present value and may not have any value in the
future, that it was err for the^ district court to consider the
federal contribution to the retirement as one of the assets of the
parties.

Chief

Justice

Crockett

dissented

from

the

majority

opinion and said he was in hardy agreement with the quote from the
Englert case and stated that the court should include anything that
is

realistic

and

retirement funds.

substantial,

even

ari expectancy

of

future

Id. at 841.

The next Utah case dealing ^ith division of retirements ^as
Dogu v._Dogu, 652 P.2d

1308

(Utah 1982).

In Dogu the husband

argued that since none of his separate retirement funds could be
withdrawn

until

he

retired,

the

total

value

of

those

funds,

$86,730.00, should not be subject to division between the parties
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even though they were all accumulated during the marriage.
1309-11.

Id. at

The Dogu court considered the decision in both Bennett

and Englert and ruled that the Bennett case reflected a failure of
proof on present value and still included the marital property
portion of the husband's retirement, even though he had not yet
retired or received the actual enjoyment of his retirement benefits
which were purely prospective.

Id.

The Dogu court then held that

it is the trial court's duty to make an equitable division of
property in a divorce action which includes assets of every nature,
including pension funds.

Id.

In Dogu the court divided the

$86,73 0.00 of retirement and considered the entire amount a marital
asset.

The Court also suggested several methods for making that

division: (1) The court could order that respondent elect a join
and survivor annuity under each retirement fund or that is an
option, with appropriate adjustments to his alimony obligation
during

the

period

following

retirement;

(2) If

respondent's

retirement rights permit this option, the court could order that
respondent elect that upon his retirement appellant be paid, in
lieu of alimony after retirement, a lump sum equal to one-half (H)
the value of the retirement benefit as of the date of divorce, plus
investment income accumulated thereafter;
order

that

appellant's

rights

to

(3)

alimony

The court might
continue

after

respondent's death or up until her own death or remarriage. Id.
The

court

recognized

that

each

of

the

foregoing

alternatives

assumed that the respondent would live long enough to retire.

The

Poena court also provided for the eventuality if the respondent dies
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before retirement.

If respondent is awarded full ownership of the

retirement funds, the court could order that upon his death before
retirement

the

commuted

value

of

appellant's

post-retirement

alimony for the period of her life expectancy be a claim against
respondent's

estate

or,

in

the

alternative,

if

respondent's

retirement rights permit this option, it could also order that
respondent elect that upon his death prior to retirement, appellant
be paid the cash value of one-half (M) of the retirement right as
of the date of the divorce, plus investment income accumulated
thereafter.

Id.

alternatives.

The court recognized that there may also be other

The court stated "in any case, the district court

may require additional evidence on the nature of the retirement
funds and the needs and preferences of the parties in order to
exercise

its

equitably."

statutory

power

to

divide

the

retirement

funds

Id. at 1311.

These three cases define the scope of the law as it existed in
Utah during 1981 and 1982 when Mrs. Parkhurst divorced Mr. Toone.
These cases indicate the trial court does have a right to look at
the military retirement benefits and make decisions regarding its
equitable division.

Later Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah

1982) overruled the holding in Bennett, followed the Dogu decision
and upheld the Englert decision and stated that it is not necessary
to consider whether pension rights are vested or nonvested.
432-33.

Id.

The court specifically said it had the right to divide any

retirement benefits even though they are in a form of deferred
compensation by the employer.

Ld.
40

The main consideration is

whether those rights accrued during the marriage, and if so, then
the court must

at least consider those benefits

equitable distribution of the marital assets.

in making an

It is interesting to

note that Woodward upheld the trial court's decision which divided
a civilian retirement benefit.

The Woodward trial took place at

approximately the same time as the trial in the Parkhurst-Toone
matter.
Subsequent cases dealing with military retirement benefits
acquired in whole or in part during the marriage have been found to
constitute marital property under Utah law and are subject to
division.

In Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),

the Utah Supreme Court again stated "the essential criteria is
whether the right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or
in part during the marriage."

Id. at 831.

The court in Greene

concluded that under Utah case law, marital property encompasses
all types of retirement funds and any retirement fund that accrued
in whole or in part during the marriage may be distributed in a
divorce proceeding.

JEd.

The Greene case and all subsequent Utah

cases have relied heavily on the statement in Englert that "marital
property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties whenever obtained and from whatever source derived; and
this includes any such pension fund or insurance."

Id.

Mrs. Parkhurst had a right to share in the military retirement
benefits earned during her marriage to Mr. Toone.
that

right

in 1981 and

1982 when

Utah recognized

this matter went

to trial.

However, because of the McCarty decision of June 25, 1981, the
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trial court did not have authority to divide the military benefits
at that time and the military retirement benefits were omitted from
the

trial

court

eliminated

the

Findings
effects

and

of

were

McCarty

not
and

considered.
permitted

USFSPA

retroactive

divisions of military retirement benefits for all divorces which
happened after June 25, 1981.

Because this divorce happened after

June 25, 1981, and because Utah law recognized the right to divide
all marital assets of whatever nature from whatever source, the
court should now consider dividing the military retirement in this
case.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DENIED
MRS. PARKHURST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO EQUITABLY
DIVIDE THE MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS PARTICULARLY WHEN
ALL OTHER MARITAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN DIVIDED ON -A~50/50
BASIS AND WHERE MRS. PARKHURST DID NOT RECEIVE ANY
ALIMONY IN LIEU OF THE RETIREMENT, AND WHERE THE MILITARY
RETIREMENT BENEFITS HAVE NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED OR PAID TO
EITHER PARTY.

Review

of the

Findings of Fact

and

the Corrected

Decree

relative to the property distribution in this case makes it clear
that the trial court's intent was to divide the property equally
between

the parties.

Toone's Utah State

The trial

retirement

court

decision

addresses Mr.

and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah

State

retirement plans but is silent on the question of Mr. Toone's naval
retirement.

The court intended to split the retirements equally

when it valued Mr. Toone's civil retirement at roughly $10,000.00
and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah State retirement at roughly $3,000.00.
The court awarded Mrs. Parkhurst $3,500.00 (i.e., one-half (M) of
the difference of $7,000.00) in other property to make up for the
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difference in retirement division.
other

marital

pursuant
Divorce

property

to Exhibit
and

parties.

valued

between

The trial court also divided

the

parties

on

a

50/50

basis

"A, " which was attached

to the Decree of

every

item

personal

property

between

the

The court specifically equalized the property on Exhibit

"A, " which was awarded to Mr. Toone at $5,766.00 and the items
awarded

to Mrs. Parkhurst

at

$8,017.00 by giving

offsets and

adjustments in paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce so that both
parties received $35,586.75 in total equity in the marital estate.
The only other asset was a parcel of property which was awarded
equally to both parties as tenants in common and was to be sold
later and the proceeds equitably divided.

In fact, the parties

sold that parcel of property on April 1995 and divided the same.
Mrs. Parkhurst was not awarded any alimony except for $1.00 a year
in paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree, and Mr. Toone never paid any
of that alimony.
Consequently, the Findings and the Decree in the original
property

division

make

property

was before

it

clear

that

the

court

it on a 50/50 basis.

This

divided
court

what

should

continue with this trend and permit Mrs. Parkhurst her rightful
equitable

share of the military retirement

created and an inequity avoided.

so that

justice is

If Mr. Toone is to receive one

hundred percent (100%) of the retirement he will receive a windfall
that was not intended.
The recent cases of Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P. 2d 830 (Utah App.
1987) and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
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both held that it may be more equitable to distribute retirement
benefits that are difficult to value later, rather than at the time
of divorce.

Marchant dealt with a federal retirement plan.

The

court in Bailey reasoned that postponing the distribution equalizes
the risk and the benefits to both parties.

"Not only is postponed

distribution generally fair, it also allows the asset to be used by
both parties in a way and at a time the asset was intended to be
used, that is 'for retirement' " .

Id. at 832.

The Bailey court

specifically found the trial court retains the discretion to divide
retirement account along with other assets and if it chooses to
divide the retirement at the date of divorce, it must make specific
findings as to reasons for immediate distribution.

Otherwise, the

distribution of retirement benefits should generally be postponed
until the benefits are received.

JEd. at 833.

There is no reason why the Court in this case should not do
likewise.
divided

all

There

is a strong

marital

property

indication that the trial
50/50

that was

before

it.

court
The

military retirement which was not before the court and could not be
because of existing law, was a military retirement which could have
been easily postponed for distribution later.

By allowing Mrs.

Parkhurst to now equitably divide that military retirement at the
date and time that it was intended to be used for retirement is in
line with the public policy and methodology provided in Marchant
and Bailey.
The fact that the military retirement was not expressly placed
in the Findings and Decree of Divorce by Mr. Toone, whose attorney
44

was supposed to draft the Decree and Order, likewise prohibits him
from arguing that he was, in fact, awarded one hundred percent
(100%) of that retirement pay. Under this logic, res judicata bars
Mr. Toone's claim that he is entitled to all of the military
retirement benefits since McCartv did not prevent Mr. Toone from at
least asking the court to make an express award of the retirement
to him; it only prevented its division between the parties.

Mr.

Toone's failure to raise his claim to one hundred percent (100%) of
the military retirement benefits at the time of divorce should bar
his attempt to make that claim now.
The Memorandum Decision regarding the Summary Judgment Order
was based in large part on the assumption that the trial court must
have taken into account the military retirement benefits and if the
court now allowed Mrs. Parkhurst to receive some share of those
benefits, all other issues regarding division of property would
have to be relitigated.
not correct.

That assumption was made in error and was

The trial court divided all of the other marital

property 50/50 and totally omitted the military retirement.

Using

the logic of the trial judge to award Mr. Toone one hundred percent
(100%) of that military retirement would now be an injustice to
Mrs. Parkhurst

since she did not receive one-half

(M) of that

benefit.
WHEREFORE, Mrs. Parkhurst respectfully requests this Court to
find that the trial court erred and that she is, in fact, entitled
to one-half (M) of the future military retirement benefits.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion the facts and law before the Court clearly show
that the parties not only omitted the military retirement benefit
from the property division and that no express mention or findings
were

issued

McCarty

and

regarding

the military

Woodward,

did

litigation on that issue.

retirement,

not: allow

for

but

actual

also

that

division

or

As such the military retirement was not

adjudicated, nor could it have been adjudicated.

Mrs. Parkhurst is

entitled to have that property divided now.
Mrs. Parkhurst is entitled to be treated fairly and equitably
in this matter.

The principles of equity outrule and outweigh the

need for finality in this case.

Public policy in Utah favors

division of military retirement benefits at the time they are to be
received by the parties.

In the limited context of omitted assets

in a divorce, public policy favoring the equitable division of
marital property outweighs the need for the stability and finality
of judgments.

WHEREFORE, Mrs. Parkhurst requests that this Court reverse the
trial court on Mr. Toone's Motion for Summary Judgment and reverse
the decision on Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
and hereby asks the Court to either remand the case back to the
trial court for further decision consistent with the opinion of the
Appellate Court or to deny Mr. Toone's Motion for Summary Judgment
and grant Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment as a
matter of law.
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DATED this 9th day of June, 1997.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Marl in JA Gran
Attorneys for
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Robert D. Atwood
Attorney for P I a i n t i f f
ZOLLINGER & ATWOOD
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
256 NORTH FIRST WEST
L O G A N , U T A H 84321
(801) 753.0012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF U T A H , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

LYNN VINCENT T O O N E ,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

RUBY JOAN T O O N E ,

*

Defendant.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

CIVIL HO.

19707

*

This matter was heard

on the 20th

day of J u l y ,

1981, before the Honorable Omer J. C a l l , District J u d g e ; the
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by his
a t t o r n e y , Robert D. Atwood, of Zollinger & Atwood.

The

D e f e n d a n t , and her a t t o r n e y , David W. S o r e n s o n , did not
appear. The parties have agreed that Plaintiff may proceed on his
motion to shorten time.

Upon conclusion of the hearing and the

Court having heard the testimony and having examined the
evidence and being fully advised
theretofore made and entered

in the premises and having

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, now makes and enters the following judgment and
Decree.
IT IS HEREBY O R D E R E D , ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the P l a i n t i f f , LYNN VINCENT T O O N E , be and

he is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the D e f e n d a n t ,
RUBY JOAN T O O N E , the same to become final upon signing of
the Decree by the Court.
2.

That the Court herein makes no order in respect

to custody, child support or division of property and that
jurisdiction

is retained by the Court to consider

said

matters at a later date.
DATED this

^ ^

day of

v W ^

J

/

1981.

W707-6>
UiMhi/yvn/iA-

- 2 -

BY THE

COURT

/-:

/
Omar J

7[

C a l l , District

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing

Decree of Divorce was m a i l e d , postpaid, to the

Defendant's a t t o r n e y , David W
Logan, Utah

8 4 3 2 1 , this

1 ,

Sorenson at 56 W
day of

sk

\4cac

\t

Center,

t-

/c(r^

,

1981.
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

2

STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE-COUNTY OF CACHE

3
4

LYNN TOONE,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

)

-vs-

)
)

RUBY TOONE#

I
CIVIL NO. 19707
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
COURT fS ORAL DECISION

'
|

)
)

1

O

CD

00

Defendant.

TRIAL ON THE MERITS RE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

11

held in the above-entitled Court and Cause on July 9, 1982,

12

on the morning calendar, before the Hon. VeNoy Christoffer-

13

sen, District Judge.

14
APPEARANCES:

15
16

For the Plaintiff

17

ARDEN W. LAURITZEN, ESQ.
Attorney at Law
180 North 100 East
Logan, Utah 84321

|
\

18
For the Defendant
19
20

DAVID W. SORENSON, ESQ.
Attorney at Law
56 West Center
Logan, Utah 84321

21
22

i

23
24
25

GEORGE A. PARKER
^j ^ /
Certified Shorthand Reporter
. /I *1A 1 A^U
208 Hall of Justice
Number.J~l~-'--"-- - -^
Logan, Utah 84321

RL3- ^S'.

*1983

S£XH S. ALLEN, Clerl:
Rv_ V .

OJJU /

-1L

a

-2-

P B O C E E D ^ N G S .

THE COURT:

As to the personal items that are on

the list that has been submitted as exhibits D-5 and -6 and i
plaintiffs one, this is pretty much the only evidence I
not |
have as to their worth, is what the parties say, so I'm/going,
to take the time here to go through each item, but I'll
start out the list and tell you what I would do if we spent
all afternoon in here doing it.
For example, the camper, value by the plaintiff
six, value by the defendant at 450.
525.

Split the difference is

Truck would be 200 and—by the defendant, and 500 by

the plaintiff.

There's a difference; a split would be 350,

to arrive at a final value.

And you can go through that on

each item and get a final value list.

*** There f s one item

I guess on exhibit six, the first item m

the possession of

Lynn, he doesn't have a value on the '80 Plymouth.
$5,460.

She has

I think that has to be treated separately.
MR. SORENSON:

All right.

Your honor, to be abso-

lutely candid with the court on that, and I can tell counsel
this, we've shown that as an

f

81 Plymouth Champ because she

thought it was an '81. The testimony today comes out as a
1980.

Those figures were arrived at by calling Alan Palmer

at Palmer's Motor to get the figures, and we'd just have to
either leave that for a later date and let the court find out

1

what that would b e —

2

THE: COURT:

Well, I'ca^tell you, if, you want to

3

figure it out to give a value, i$

4

the difference, or the middle difference between l o w and high

5

book and subtract the balance d u ^ a n c j give the equity b a l -

6

ance and then allot that figure.

7

M R . SORENSON;

8

THE C O U R T :

9

Fine.

Okay.

that

you get w h a t the l o w —

|

tye«d

Now a s

accept t h a t .

|

those items such as —

to

that he w a n t e d — t h e computer and the electrical p a r t s , grill,

10

s h e w m t e d the camp stand, cooler chest w h i c h — s o m e of them

11

y o u both indicated a willingness

12

that you are, using the same mett\ o d

13

it as to w h o gets the total v a l u ^ if you're willing to e x -

14

change them.

15

kind of a hassle about forcing ar\ exchange.

16 |
17

M R . SORENSON:

M R . LAURITZEN:

exchange.

Those,

f value, you just switch

THE COURT:

would be different

t going to get into any

Can w e ^ 0 through those items o n e

We can d o t h a t .

Yeah.

The o n l y

one

t}?<?£ you dos?*b already

would b e the question on the p e r s o n a i

23 I attach any value at a l l , it's siit\piy

I think counsel

pape

that I have that

have

in your notes

r s , and this doesn

a matter

of access to

24 J make copies, and I would say he Should b e entitled to do
25

1

| c a n do that, can't w e ?

20 I

22

no

0

t h e

] b y o n e , the computer?

18 !
19

I f , y o u 0 r e not, I'm

make

to

that.

** N o w are there any other then questions that you

,

-4-

can't arrive a t at least ,a total .figure that each receives
on the personal-fi1tems: under, the method I've outlined, withoutf
MR. SORENSON:

No, we'd accept the court's method

of handling that.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Then once you reach a total on

those values and who has what, you can reach a total value
as to—one may come out say $5,000 worth of stuff and another
seven, so you have a difference.
the other.

One is getting more than

We'll just say for example ** that the plaintiff

has $3,000 more than the defendant he receives by way of
personal property.

We'll just keep that as an example. **

One thing that I'm really not sure about, and that's on this
for example Willis's appraisal says Tract Two at $2,800. **
Would it be possible for you both to agree as to that particular parcel, to go ahead through a sale and split it?
MR. LAURITZEN:
MR. SORENSON:
THE COURT:

Yeah, that's what we'd do.
She'd agree.

Why don't we say as to parcel two it

will be sold and after the costs of sale that the parties
split the proceeds equally.

Then we don't need to worry

about plugging a speculative figure in there. ** Now the
other parcel I assume is in the possession of the plaintiff.
Again there8s a difference, one being 76,000 in round figures
as opposed to 82,500. ** So taking into account the difference in valuation and a reason why it could be greater than

-5-

1

the 75, I'll put -that ati BO. . ** <And I will make that total

2

labor and materials at a value x>f -$3,000.

3

is I think the principle is the same whether it's 3,000 or

4

a hundred thousand.

** What I'm saying

But first of all we take the 80,000
mortgage
5 figure, and then I don't know what the/balance is today.

6
7
8
9
10
11

MR. SORENSON:

** As of 7-1-82 a printout shows

$25,489.76.
** THE COURT:

Take that $25,489, make it 490, what

do you get, 54,510?
MR. SORENSON:

Are you taking it from the 80,000

or from the 77,000?

12

THE COURT:

80.

13

MR. SORENSON:

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

54,510.

I think that half of that is $27,255.

15 You take those as two base figures then to start with.

Now

16

on the retirement, his is ten, hers is three. ** She's

17

entitled to half of his, which is $5,000, he's entitled to

18

half of hers, which is 1,500.

19

his ten, but then he'd owe her $3,500.

20

credit of $3,500 to be added on to her $27,255.

21

got to do it another way.

22

to her, he gets a credit of three on what I think he's im-

23

proved after the divorce that adds to the value of the house.

24

So on the retirement she has a $3,500 credit, he has a 3,000.

25

You'll have to adjust it so that the credits adjust out what

She keeps her three, he keeps
So she'd have a full
Well, we

As I said, this goes as a credit

1

she's going to have finally either added or deducted to this

2

$27,255.

3

this is the one with the house on it.

4

going to sell. **

5

but I don f t know what this figure is going to b e , and that is

6

why I gave you this example:

7

has 3,000 more of the personal than she does, so he's got

8

$3,000 more that she's entitled to half of as far as value

9

is concerned, so that would give her an additional

10

She already gets that as half of the property, and
The other one they're

Now then, you arrive at another credit,

Suppose it comes out that he

1,500

credit. **

11

MR. SORENSON:

And that's something that counsel

12

will have to work out, I'm assuming.

13

time today to go through each one.

14

THE COURT:

Not going to take the

Yeah, to get that figure.

I'm not

15

sure what that will b e , but I'm assuming $1,500 just for the

16

purposes o f — a n d she would also have $3,500 on the retire-

17

merit, which is now fixed.

1

8

and the plaintiff three, so she's got an extra two coming.

19

So you take the 27,255 and that would make 29,255 and then

20

you take his credit for the equity in the house and take the

21

two from that, so his would be 29,255.

22

sense, so you still come up with the 8,000 when you add

23

them?

24
25

MR. SORENSON:
there.

That would give her 5,000 credits

Yes.

Does that make any

We can see what the shift is

You're just adding a bigger lien and bigger credit

-7-

1

against the property.

2

THE COURT:

Yes*

Because I think when you balance

3

all of these credits you're going to have to make it a lien

4

of that figure against'the property.

5

out this personal property thing, and say she does have a

6

lien then against the house of $29,250, that the lien is now

7

due and payable, except that I understand, I f m sure that he

8

cannot come up with, tomorrow, 29,000 whatever it is.

9

will have a note for that much at present legal interest. **

10

I think it's twelve per cent.

11

MR. LAURITZEN:

12

**

So after you work

So she

But it's in the statute.

Or can he in the alternative give

her the house and let her pay it?

13

THE COURT:

Well, either that or sell it.

14

**^MR. SORENSON:

According to Bruce Jorgensen,

15

your honor, on 29,000 even at twelve per cent, $319.31 a

16

month. **

17

THE COURT:

18

Okay, I'll make it a 20-year loan,

legal rate, and pay that monthly figure.

Now I have a prob- '

I
19 I lem with the balloon figure at this time because you get
20

into so much speculation of what his situation is going to

21

be in five years, but I will reserve jurisdiction under that

22

provision under the statute where the court can reserve juris-f-

23

diction on custody and property settlement, to undertake any

24

motions at the five-year period to see what should be done on

25

it.

1

As to alimony, ** I'll make a dollar a year alimony

2

provision- **

3

contribute to the support of her daughter in the amount of

4

$50.00 a month, which may be deducted from the monthly pay-

5

ment.

6

her attorney's fees ** based on the fractional difference

7

in their income ** the amount of $275.00 plus costs.

8
9

As to child support, I will have the defendant

And as to attorney's fees, that he contribute toward

** If he still has the insurance in force, the
minor children be kept on as beneficiaries for at least half

10 of the value.

** If you can get the cash value that's

11

satisfactory with Mr. Lauritzen that you have a correct fig-

12

ure, she can have a credit again to be fixed like we were

13

shown here of credits, of one-half.

14

MR. SORENSON:

As of July, 1982, there's $4,698.50

15 on the Beneficial Life policy.
16

THE COURT:

If you can satisfy Mr. Lauritzen that

17 that's correct and there's nothing wrong with it, she'd have
18 J an additional credit of $2,349.00.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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David W. Sorenson
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
LYNN VINCENT TOONE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]

RUBY JOAN TOONE,

)i
Defendant.

OLSON HOGGAN
& SORENSON
.TORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
P O BOX 525
LOGAN UTAH 84321
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 1551

])
)
)I

CORRECTED

SUPPLEMENTAL
JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Civil No. 19707

]

This matter came on for hearing on the 9th day of July, 1982
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person and was
represented by his attorney, A.W. Lauritzen; the Defendant was
present and was represented by her attorneys, Olson, Hoggan &
Sorenson, David W. Sorenson. The parties were sworn and testified
and documents having been presented and admitted into Court, and
the Court having granted a divorce in this action on the 20th day
of July, 1981, reserving until this time to hearing the matter of
property settlement, the Court having made its decision at the
conclusion of the hearing from the Bench, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being
fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following:

-21.

The items of personal property awarded to the Plaintiff
lf fl

are incorporated in Schedule

A

attached hereto and have a value

of $5,766.00; the items of personal property awarded to the
ff n

Defendant are incorporated in Schedule

A

attached hereto and

have a value of $8,017.00.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Plymouth Champ automobile

subject to the indebtedness thereon.

There exists a difference

between the value and the indebtedness on said vehicle in the
amount of $618.00 as of July 20, 1982.
3.

The parties own the following parcels of real

property:
Parcel 1
All of that part of Lots 3 and 4, Block 2, Plat "B" Richmond
City Survey lying West: of the canal and described as:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, said Block 2, and
running thence East 225 feet, more or less to the
right-of-way line of the canal; thence Southwesterly along
the right-of-way line of said canal, to the West line of Lot
4; thence North 245 feet, more or less, along the West line
of said Lot 4 to point of beginning. Containing 0.63 acre
more or less.
Parcel 2 (Home)
Part of the West half of Section 7 described as follows and
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 7 as follows:
Beginning at a point 1328.25 feet by measurement (1320 feet
by record) and 125 feet East of the Northwest corner of the
Southwest quarter of said Section 7, and running thence South
239.85 feet; thence South 79°18' East 549 feet to the High
Creek Canyon Road; thence North 21°24f East 200 feet; thence
North 79°17 , 30 n West 207.2 feet; thence North 4°53' East
129.7 feet; thence North 75°45f West 464 feet; thence South
88.2 feet to point of beginning, and further described as
being situate in Township 14 North, Range 1 and 2 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
4.
&

SORENSOT

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

56 WEST CENTER
P O

LOGAN

Each of the parties are awarded one-half (1/2) the equity

of the home, $27,255.00 subject to adjustment for values of other
.

_

•

i

j

,

•

11ems as e 1 sewhere provided herein.

n

1

.

.

- -

Plaintiff

.

-

,

1

1

1

is awarded the home

BOX 525
UTAH 8 4 3 2 !

(801)752 1551

433
/a
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(Parcel 2, paragraph 3 herein) subject to any and all
indebtedness thereon and a lien in favor of Defendant in the sum
of $32,505.29 (equity of $27,569.75 plus interest of $4,935.54),
which Defendant is hereby awarded and, which is now due and
payable, which lien includes $4,935.54 interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from July 9, 1982, the date of the
hearing to December 31, 1983, and payable monthly over a period of
twenty (20) years, payments to commence on January 1, 1984 in the
sum of $357.85 and $357.85 on the 1st day of each month thereafter
until January 1, 2004, on which date the entire unpaid balance of
principal and interest to be paid.

Said sum shall bear intere#£-^

at 12% per annum from January 1, 1984 until paid.

The/Court ^^fc-^-

retains jurisdiction for a period of five (5) years -dre^B^- which cw
time either party may motion the Court to revise due date of the
loan or other property matters herein.
5.

Parcel 1, as described in paragraph 3 is awarded equally

to the two parties as tenants in common and is to be sold and
after the costs of sale, each of the parties shall divide the
proceeds equally.
6.

Plaintiff's retirement is worth $10,000.00 and

Defendant's is worth $3,000.00.

Adjusting for one-half (1/2) the

value of each otherfs retirement leaving a credit in favor of
Defendant in the amount of $3,500.00.

As an offset, Plaintiff is

awarded a credit of $3,000.00 for improvements to the home leaving
a total credit in favor of Defendant from the $3,500.00 to
$3,000.00 in the sum of $500.00.
7.

Defendant is awarded a credit of $2,349.00 as and for

one-half (1/2) of the cash value of the insurance policy of the
parties.
8.
DLSON, HOGGAN
a SORENSON
ORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
P O. BOX 525
.OGAN. UTAH 84321
(801 ) 752-1551

year.

Defendant is awarded alimony in the sum of $1.00 per

-49.

Defendant is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff for

attorney's fees in the sum of $275.00, plus costs in the sum of
$2.50.
10.

Based upon the credits and net values of property the

respective values and creidts/debits are determined as follows:
Plaintiff
Home
$26,662.75
Net credit of retirement and
home improvements
500.00
Car (1/2 equity)
309.00
Personal property
5,766.00
Insurance (1/2 cash value)
2,349.00
TOTAL
$35,586.75
Defendant
Home
Personal property
TOTAL
11.

$27,569.75
8,017.00
$35,586.75

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain the children as

beneficiaries on at least one-half of his life insurance and to
maintain the same in force so long as the children are minors.
12.

Each should be and is awarded the property now in their

possession.
13.

Defendant shall be and is awarded alimony in the sum of

$1.00 per year.
14.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of

$50.00 per month as and for child support which may be deducted
from the monthly payment of the lien to Defendant from Plaintiff.

/'

VeNoy Christoffersetf
D i s t r i c t 'Judge *OLSON, HOGGAN
& SORENSON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
P O BOX 525
LOGAN UTAH 84321
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 1551

DC

* I
V-\ \

-5HAND CARRY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand carried an exact copy of the
foregoing Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree to Arden W.
Lauritzen at 180 North 100 East, P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah
84321 , postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this \w-' day of December,
1983.
^ - ^ ' . / . ,('

/',

avid W. Sorenson

EXHIBIT "A"

ITEM

HELD
BY

Camper
J
Truck (Dodge)
J
J
Freezer
J
Clothes Washer
J
Television Set
J
Computer
J
Piano
Stereo (Old)
Speakers
Amplifier
J
Tuner
J
Stereo (New)
Tape Recorder (Akai) J
J
Microwave Oven
Wheat Grinder & Mixer• J
Sewing Machine
J
Double Bed
J
Single Bed
J
Green Couch (2ea)
J
New Sofa (2ea)
J
Flowered Chair
J
Dresser & Chest of Dr .J
Card Tables (2ea)
J
Folding Chairs (8ea) J
Hoover Vacuum
J
Shop Vacuum
J
Exercycle
J
Hanging Seats (2)
J
Antique Table
J
Antique Chairs (6ea) J
J
Slide Projector
Guns
J
22 Rifle
J
243 Rifle
J
Binoculars
Paintings
J
Farm
J
Flowers
J
String
Shield (Mexico)

VALUE
EST. BY
JOAN

VALUE
EST. BY
LYNN

FINAL
VALUE

$450.00
200.00
150.00
20.00
40.00
250.00
850.00

$600.00
500.00
500.00
100.00
600.00
300.00
1,300.00

$525.00
350.00
325.00
60.00
320.00
275.00
1,075.00

J
J
J
J
J
J
J

100.00

375.00
275.00
250.00
287.50
80.00
85.00
35.00
437.50
32.50
55.00

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

30.00

400.00
150.00
100.00
400.00
300.00
400.00
150.00
150.00
50.00
600.00
50.00
100.00
60.00
120.00
130.00
60.00
60.00
60.00
100.00
150.00
60.00

110.00
87.50
35.00
35.00
40.00
87.50
87.50
45.00

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

40.00
90.00
10.00

40.00
160.00
30.00

40.00
125.00
20.00

J
J
J

100.00
20.00

110.00

J

150.00
200.00
175.00
10.00
20.00
20.00
275.00
15.00
10.00
40.00
45.00
10.00
10.00
20.00
100.00

PARTY TO
KEEP ITEM
LYNN JOAN

100.00

-2-

ITEM

HELD
BY

VALUE
EST. BY
JOAN

VALUE
EST. BY
LYNN

FINAL
VALUE

PARTY TO
KEEP ITEM
LYNN JOAN

Plants
Fig
J
Fern
J
Palm
J
Schefflera
J
10.00
150.00
80.00
J
14.00
100.00
57.00
Lamps (2ea)
Toaster
J
2.00
10.00
6.00
Blender
J
3.00
30.00
16.50
Dishes
China
J ,
Stoneware
J
Pots & Pans
J
Silverware & etc.
J
200.00 1 ,000.00
600.00
Camp Stove
J
10.00
30.00
20.00
Bedding
J
Unsellable
300.00
150.00
J
90.00
100.00
95.00
Carpet for stairs
Tile for Entry
J
150.00
150.00
150.00
Sleeping Bags (2ea)
J
Unsellable
40.00
20.00
Chain Saw (Gas)
J
95.00
200.00
147.50
Chain Saw (Electric) J
20.00
30.00
25.00
Saber Saw
J
20.00
30.00
25.00
1/2" Drill
J
20.00
40.00
30.00
Antique Chairs (3ea) J
20.00
100.00
60.00
Large Pillows (3ea)
J
15.00
60.00
37.50
Dehydrator
J
Gift
100.00
gift
Typewriter
J
20.00
50.00
35.00
Pressure Cookers (2ea)J
50.00
100.00
75.00
Head Phones
J
5.00
20.00
12.50
Wall Decorations
(Shield Mexico)
J
(Listed on page 2 with paintings)
Frozen Food
(in freezer)
J
200.00
200.00
Cash
(from checkbook)
J
510.00
510.00
Motorcycle (Honda)
L
300.00
300.00
300.00
L
Camper Shell
L
75.00
100.00
87.50
L
Rototiller
L
150.00
150.00
150.00
L
Lawn Mower
L
75.00
50.00
62.50
L
L
600.00
600.00
600.00
L
Organ (Thomas)
Atari
L
90.00
100.00
95.00
L
175.00
200.00
187.50
L
Table Saw
L
Sander
L
130.00
150.00
140.00
L
Water Bed
L
30.00
100.00
65.00
L
Vacuum (Filter Queen) L
10.00
20.00
15.00
L

438

J
J
J
J

J
J

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

J
J

J

J
J.
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ITEM

HELD
BY

Movie Projector
L
Lamp (Mexico)
L
Paintings
L
Acropolis
Large Vase
L
Food Storage
L
Camera
L
Gun (308)
L
Single bed
L
Bedding, Linens
L
Couch/Bed (grn/vinyl) L
Couch (brown section) L
Antique coffee table L
Kitchen dining set
L
Chest of drawers (2) L
Cast iron grill
L
Desk
L
Wood buring stove
L
Hanging light
(cappa shell)
L
Wooden hanging light L
Area rugs (2)
L
Movie Screen
L
Movie Camera
L
Books
L
3-piece section shelves
(wood)
L
Sleeping bags
L
Lantern (camp)
L
Fishing poles & reels L
Scope/for 22
L
Plants
L
Plant pots/fertilizers/
tools
L
Ice Chest (cooler)
L
Igloo cooler (5 gal.) L
Chaise Lounge
L
Shower pulsator
L
Ping Pong Table
L
Games & Puzzles
L
Piano Books
L
Portable TV
L
Metal storage shelves L

VALUE
EST. BY
JOAN
30.00

VALUE
EST. BY
LYNN
40.00
20.00

FINAL
VALUE

PARTY TO
KEEP ITEM
LYNN JOAN

35.00
20.00

L
L

180.00
100.00
140.00
2,000.00
200.00
1 ,100.00
150.00
200.00
175.00
95.00
200.00
147.50
20.00
20.00
Unsellable Unsellable
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
10.00
10.00

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

20.00

20.00
8.00
15.00
350.00

8.00
15.00
350.00

L
L
L
L

65.00
20.00
25.00
15.00
35.00
75.00

65.00
20.00
25.00
15.00
35.00
75.00

L
L
L
L
L
L

15.00

15.00

5.00
10.00
10.00
10.00

5.00
10.00
10.00
10.00

L
L
L
L
L
L

10.00
15.00
10.00
8.00
25.00
30.00
60.00
20.00
10.00
50.00

10.00
15.00
10.00
8.00
25.00
30.00
60.00
20.00
10.00
50.00

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

-4-

ITEM

HELD
BY

Hand cools &
wheelbarrow
Mechanic tools
Garden tools
Ladders
Florescent light
fixtures(new/tubes)
Building supplies
Unfinished Cupboards
Fence posts/metal
Hand Sander
Drill (3/8")
Drill Bits
Joint Planer (6")
•Compressor
Router/bits &
accessories
Vise
Weed Eater
Weed Sprayer

VALUE
EST. BY
JOAN

VALUE
EST . BY
LYNN

PARTY TO
KEEP ITEM
LYNN JOAN

FINAL
VALUE

L
L
L
L

90.00
200.00
60.00
25.00

90.00
200.00
60.00
25.00

L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

90.00
500.00
20.00
50.00
15.00
20.00
20.00
90.00
165.00

90.00
500.00
20.00
50.00
15.00
20.00
20.00
90.00
165.00

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L

50.00
50.00
10.00
15.00

50.00
50.00
10.00
15.00

L
L
•

..!•

L

Exhibit D

IN THE FIRST, JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. COUNTY OF, CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

*
*

LYNN VINCENT TOONE,

*

Plaintiff,
vs.
RUBY JOAN TOONE, nka
RUBY JOAN PARKHURST,

*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

Case No. 814019707

*
*
*
*

Defendant.

THIS MATTER I S BEFORE THE COURT u p o n a M o t i o n f o r Summary
J u d g m e n t a n d D e f e n d a n t ' s C r o s s - M o t i o n f o r Summary J u d g m e n t a n d a n
O b j e c t i o n h a s now b e e n f i l e d t o t h e p r o p o s e d O r d e r g r a n t i n g Summary
J u d g m e n t i n f a v o r of t h e

Plaintiff.

W i t h r e s p e c t t o O b j e c t i o n No. 1, t h e l a n g u a g e s u g g e s t e d by t h e
Defendant would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e .

Though t h e r e l i e f

r e q u e s t e d by

t h e D e f e n d a n t m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e , i t would r e q u i r e a n e v i d e n t i a r y
h e a r i n g t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n d what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,

other

t h o s e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e F i n d i n g s , w e r e made by t h e t r i a l
1982 h e a r i n g
example,

if

relative

to the d i s t r i b u t i o n

the Court,

at that

time,

evidentiary

judge

of p r o p e r t y .

t o some v a l u e

in
For

determined to divide

p r o p e r t y e q u a l l y and gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n
military retirement,

than

the

in the

t h a t would have t o be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h an

hearing

a n d may n e v e r

be s u b j e c t

to

final

determination.

SEP 1 0 1996
By

r^of
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Though i t
fact,

that

t h e Defendant

retirement
specifically
Decree,

c o u l d b e a r g u e d now, f i f t e e n

because

it

apportioned

(15) y e a r s a f t e r

s h o u l d h a v e a p o r t i o n of t h e
had v a l u e at
pursuant

that

military

t i m e and was

t o Woodward i n t h e

t h e C o u r t w o u l d h a v e t o know a l l

the

not

Divorce

of t h e d e t a i l s

of

the

d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h w e r e a v a i l a b l e a t
that

time.
"The rule of res judicata
precludes litigation of issues
that could properly have been raised and applies to every
question relevant to and following within the preview of
the initial action with respect to matters of both claim
or grounds of recovery and defense which could have been
presented by the exercise of good diligence." 46 Am.
Juris 2nd Judgments Sec. 26.
In this case, certainly the value of the military retirement

could have and may have been considered by the Court.

That the

Court did not have jurisdiction to order distribution of military
retirements did not preclude consideration of the value of the
retirement or offsetting that with other property.

If the Court

did not then address the issue with respect to military retirement,
and should do so now, it would have to relitigate each of those
other p r o p e r t y and support issues w h i c h have b e e n r a i s e d ,
litigated, and ruled upon.
would be voided.

In doing so, the rule of res

judicata

It would be inappropriate to litigate this issue

where it could have been raised then, but was not, because now it

TOONE v, TOONE
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could be only addressed independently without reassessing all of
the other property which is subject to res

judicata.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of res

judicata,

as well

as the statute of limitations, and to some degree, laches, is to
reach a point of finality in cases whereupon parties can rely upon
what has been done.

The language therefore requested by Defendant

with respect to Objection No. 1 is denied.
With respect to Objection No. 2, relative to Paragraph 4 on
page 4, the request is that the Court find when the statute of
limitations began to run.

The difficulty with this language is it

can be argued that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary in
order to determine when the Defendant became aware of the new
statute or could or should have become aware.

The presumption of

law is that people become aware of public laws when they are
passed.

There was nothing argued relative to any incapacity or

inability in the Defendant. Apparently, if she would show that she
simply did not come across or have any reason to come across the
law until recently, that does not toll any of the statute of
limitations

The Court would find that the statute of limitations

began to run When the statute became effective, or the Decree
became final, whichever last occurred.

The problem with when the

law was passed and became effective after the Decree, is that it
might be argued that (despite state law to the contrary) perhaps

TOONE v. TOONE
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the passage of the new statute was a change in circumstances.

A

passage of a statute, in and of itself, is not, however, a change
of circumstances.

The language of the federal statute which allows

state courts to dictate the distribution of military retirement,
even on a retroactive basis, is not state law. Whether that allows
for retroactive application would depend not only on the statute
but also on state law relative to modification of decrees.

The

Objection then is denied to the extent above addressed.
With respect to Objection No. 3, the Defendant is correct.
The Court did, however, opine that, since principles of equity
apply in divorce cases, and even though this is presented to the
Court as a matter of law, equitable considerations would, based
upon the affidavits and memoranda supplied, dictate that there
should be finality to the judgment.

The parties should be able to

rely upon the decrees of the Court, and for the same reason that
principles of equity may bar this type of action, the statute of
limitations does likewise

As mentioned above, at least some

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h respect to searching for f i n a l i t y , that
principles based on res

judicata,

laches, estoppel, as well as

statute of limitations have in common.
For the above reasons, Objection No. 4 is also somewhat welltaken
res

Though the Court did not conclude that, as a matter of law,

judicata,

bars further action, the principles behind

res

^\

^\(

A
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judicata

and the reasons for it and the desires for finality,

certainly affect this case.

Though the Court's Findings do not

mention military retirement as being adjudicated, the absence of
the a d j u d i c a t i o n also makes applicable the doctrine of
judicata.

res

To that extent, the Objection is sustained.

With respect to Objection No. 5, the Objection is mis-styled
and the McCartv decision does not forbid state courts from
adjudicating military retirements.

Federal law simply did not

recognize state courts' adjudication of the same.

Federal law in

that instance pre-empted state law and therefore the state courts
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate military retirements, but
more specifically what they did not have is recognition by the
Federal government of military retirements.

The fact that there

was no adjudication of military retirement does not mean that the
matter was not res
Decree is res

judicata.

judicata

The decision in fact was decided, the

and that does not allow the Court to go back

and reopen the issue as the distribution of the parties' property
was in fact done in finality.
The Defendant also objected to the proposed Order by the
Plaintiff in total in that the Court did provide an opportunity to
file a supplemental brief.

The Court received the supplemental

brief toqether with a Request for Reconsideration.

TOONE v. TOONE
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Defendant has argued that the Court should not, because this
is a case of first impression in Utah, grant lightly Summary
Judgment without considering evidence and facts as they relate to
critical issues of law.

The Defendant may understand that this

case is not taken lightly and a summary disposition is not light
treatment in any case.
The problem with a hearing is the Court would not be benefited
by evidence as to what occurred in the 1982 hearing other than what
it has already received by way of affidavit.

It has certainly been

apprised of the fact that the Court did not specifically consider
the military retirement, that the Defendant did not plead for
military retirement or share the military retirement, that whether
she did not do so because she was advised not to do so, is unknown
to her or to the Court, nor would the Court be b e n e f i t e d by
testimony by her counsel as to that issue as that can be supplied
by affidavit and has not been so supplied.
The deeper problem, however, is that the Court would have to
relitigate and re-adjudicate all of the property issues which were
adjudicated in the 1982 hearing.

That would require a total

reevaluation of all the distribution of the property including
perhaps the distribution of the retirement of which the Plaintiff
has been relying and anticipating.

That throws out all of the

reasons for statute of limitations and equitable considerations in

TOONE v. TOONE
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favor of finality and reliance.

It is given that the Defendant was

not informed about the change in federal law and that she received
no actual knowledge about the change in federal law until 1995.
The Court would not be benefited by any testimonial information
thereon with respect to a hearing as it is not a fact in dispute.
Nor is it disputed that she acted within reasonable time after she
found out about the 1983 statute.
any of the issues.

That, however, does not resolve

The fact that the military retirement was

vested when the parties were married in 1979 but not payable for
two (2) more years is not a fact in dispute either.
Should the Court consider this matter to be a 60(b) motion,
with respect to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excuse, neglect,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or service of process matters,
such an action would have to be brought within three (3) months
under 60(b) . With respect to whether the judgment is void,
satisfied, released, discharged, or reversed or otherwise vacated,
such may be brought later and on an independent action.

Subsection

7 of 60(b) provides and allows for any other reasons justifying
relief or modification of judgment.

"The Rule, of course, does not

limit the power of the court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."

There is, however,

simply no allegation of fraud involved here nor does the Court

TOONE v. TOONE
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believe that

60(b)

c o n t r o l s the i s s u e and a l l o w s an

a c t i o n b y way o f p e t i t i o n

t o modify t o be b r o u g h t

independent
and

thereby

c i r c u m v e n t s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i v e t o d o m e s t i c
actions,

including

considerations

change

of

circumstances,

equitable

s u c h a s l a c h e s and e s t o p p e l .

The D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e C o u r t may
reserve jurisdiction

r e l a t i v e to p r o p e r t y i s s u e s and does

n e g a t e a n a p p l i c a t i o n of s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s .
did,

b a s e d upon a l l

But e v e n i f

the evidence the Court has b e f o r e

a p p a r e n t l y t h e Court would n o t b e n e f i t

by t h e e v i d e n c e

perhaps with r e s p e c t t o the p a r t i e s ' personal f i n a n c i a l

it,

not
it
and

except

situations,

e q u i t a b l y t h e C o u r t would be u n w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e t h e

relief

requested.
The c a s e s c i t e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t

relative

to the

a u t h o r i t y and d i s c r e t i o n i n making e q u i t a b l e p r o p e r t y
all

Court's

divisions,

p r o p e r t y w h i c h was on a l a t e r d a t e of w h i c h p r o p e r t y

unknown o r u n d i s c l o s e d o v e r some r e a s o n n o t e n t i r e l y a d j u d i c a t e d
unquestioned.

was
is

W h e t h e r a t t h e t i m e of t h e D e c r e e t h i s p r o p e r t y w a s ,

u n q u e s t i o n a b l y by f e d e r a l l a w , i n d e p e n d e n t and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y of
the P l a i n t i f f ,

the fact

t h a t t h e Court did not mention o r

t o d i v i d e i t d o e s n o t now l e a v e i t o p e n t o f u r t h e r
later

t i m e and p r i n c i p l e s of res

judicata

attempt

division at a

apply to a l l

the

other

TOONE v, TOONE
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property involved and this then would have to be divided absent any
consideration of that property which has already been divided.
Certainly the Court recognizes the limited application of
Green v. Green, and Gardner v. Gardner, cited by the Defendant and
that military retirement should be considered in dividing assets to
the parties, further that Woodward can apply now directly to
marital property.
The Defense opined and argued that because domestic actions
specifically are equitable and subject to equitable remedies, and
the statute of limitations is a matter of law, that the defense of
laches is the only defense that can be asserted.

As interesting a

theory as that is, the defense can cite no law in support of that
position.

Certainly judgments which come out of a divorce action

are subject to application of law and subject to statute of
limitations execution.

Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated

relative to the Court's continued jurisdiction, does not negate the
application of statute of limitations.

Again, no law is cited for

that theory.
Defendant is correct, however, in that the issue of laches may
not have applicability without having an evidentiary hearing. That
would be true but for the fact the Defendant has also requested
summary disposition in her favor which exposes Defendant then to a
summary disposition against her for the same reasons.

If the facts

TOONE v. TOONE
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are not an issue for a counter motion for summary judgment, they
c e r t a i n l y c a n ' t be a r g u e d to be an i s s u e w i t h r e s p e c t to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Though the Defendant is

correct that laches cannot be imputed to one who is ignorant of the
facts, the issue specifically implied here is whether the Defendant
is ignorant, not of the facts, but of the law and certainly a
knowledge of the law is imputed to the parties, otherwise the
defense of not knowing the law could always be raised.
The third point raised by the defense is that because

the

military retirement benefits earned during the marriage were not
payable until a later event, they are more properly divided when
that event occurs.

That type of approach to these cases would lead

the property distributions open for a long period of time.

Absent

an order to that effect, it would be inappropriate for the Court to
allow the same.

Certainly to some degree the Court's jurisdiction

continues as the children become older and as the parties' alimony
and support need to be adjusted when those changes occur, the Court
can exercise its jurisdiction.

But the military retirement

benefits existed and were extant at the time of the Decree.

The

parties knew of them, and because of the status of the law or their
understanding of the status of the law, did not apparently raise
the issue at that time, does not allow them to be raised at later

*~\ n
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time when the law change and the parties become aware of the change
in the law.
The case in Marchant wherein the Court is said to have erred
with respect the distribution of retirement benefits at the time of
the divorce rather than the point of distribution of the benefits
later, is inappropos.

In that case, because there was inability to

place a reasonable or realistic value of the retirement benefits,
it would have been better to distribute them at a later time.

But

the Order for later distribution must have been in effect for that
to become effective at the time of the Decree.

In this case, there

was no order for a later distribution mentioned at all, and to
raise it now after some fifteen (15) years have passed would not
only be inequitable but contrary to whole concept of litigation in
order to resolve with some degree of finality the dispute between
parties.
As harsh as this remedy may appear, the aim of finality in
litigation is beneficial.

Parties live and rely upon decrees, in

this case it can be assumed that the Plaintiff has relied on and
expected military retirement in total, and to suggest now that it
should be divided in half (1/2) may benefit the Defendant largely
but certainly would work to the great detriment of the Plaintiff.
Though there is no specific evidence or testimony on that issue,
and that is one of the facts which Defendant argues would be heard
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in addressing a hearing,

i t c o u l d o n l y be so a f t e r

d e t e r m i n e s t h a t s u c h a h e a r i n g would be a p p r o p r i a t e .

the

Based upon

t h e l a w c i t e d b y t h e p a r t i e s and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e o f ,
hearing is

Court

such a

denied.

The M o t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s d e n i e d .

The O b j e c t i o n

to

t h e p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s h a s b e e n a d d r e s s e d and b o t h o v e r r u l e d i n p a r t
and s u s t a i n e d
Plaintiff

in p a r t as above a d d r e s s e d .

Counsel

i s d i r e c t e d to prepare another Order g r a n t i n g

J u d g m e n t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s Memorandum D e c i s i o n .
DATED t h J k ^ T c A4/ I *>?3fry of S e p t e m b e r ,

</' °° ^0>>
\

^

.

•

V- BY

1996.

THE C0URT

;-.•.••>

.' JUDGE G6RDON' J . LOW
-FIRST DISTRICT COURT

for

the

Summary

TOONE v. TOONE
#814019707
Page 13
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Lynn Vincent Toone v. Ruby Joan
Toone, Case no. 814019707, postage prepaid, this
September, 1996,
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to the following:

MARLIN GRANT, ESQ.
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525

GEORGE W. PRESTON, ESQ,
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 843 21

Deputy Court Clerk

i:\wp\toone.mem

day of

Exhibit E

George W. Preston, #2643
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
(801)752-3551
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LYNN VINCENT TOONE,

Plaintiff,
vs.
RUBY JOAN TOONE, nka
RUBY JOAN PARKHURST,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

AMENDED
ORDER
GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
VJ40
Civil No. 19707

*

Defendant.

*

This matter came on before the court on May 15, 1996, upon the petition of the Defendant,
Ruby Joan Toone, through her attorney, Marlin Grant, for division of retirement benefits. The
petition was answered by the PlaintiiBf through his attorney, George W. Preston. On or about January
18, 1996, the Plaintifffileda Motion for Summary Judgement, which Motion was answered by the
Defendant and the Defendantfileda Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment.
The court, having considered the matter carefully, as a result of the submission by the parties
of uncontested facts, which the court acknowledges as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff and Defendant were married on June 20, 1958.

2.

The parties were divorced on July 6, 1981. The Divorce Decree reserved for trial at

a later date the issue of the division of real and personal property.

3.

A hearing for the division of personal property was held on July 9, 1982 before the

honorable VeNoy Christoffersen.
4.

Thereafter the court on or about December 17, 1983 entered a Supplemental

Judgment and Decree dividing the assets of the parties, including, but not limited to, personal
property, automobiles, real estate, retirement benefits, alimony, and lump sum payments by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant.
5.

The Plaintiff entered military service in May of 1958 and retired in 1969 and thereafter

served with the Military Reserves and Air National Guard for eleven years, ultimately retiring in 1976.
The Plaintiffs military retirement was earned as of 1976, but is not payable until the Plaintiff reaches
age 60 on May 3, 1998.
6.

The Congress of the United States enacted Public Law 97-252 on September 8, 1982,

to become effective on February 1, 1983, and was entitled the Uniformed Services Former Spouses
Protection Act and was codified under United States Code, Title 10, Section 1408.
7.

An amendment to the act was passed by Congress making the Act retroactive to June

26, 1981.
8.

The act recognizes the right of state courts to distribute military retirement or retainer

pay to a spouse or former spouse. The act itself does not provide for an automatic entitlement to the
former spouse of a portion of the member's pay.
9.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah decided the case of Woodward v. Woodward

on November 4, 1982, approximately four months after the hearing to determine a division of
property rights and approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the entry of a Supplemental Decree by the
District Court of Cache County.
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I li I >elnidanl tiled i Petition for Modification of the Supplemental Decree on or
about October 23, 1995.
The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the following issues: 1)
Whether or not the action brought h\ Ik Dclendanl isln.'vond Ihc statutes i>f limitations; 2) W hether
or not the Defendant has waived or relinquished any claim she may have to the Plaintiffs military
retirement, *) W Mel her oil not tl le Defendant is entitled to a portion of the military retirement under
the decisions of Woodward v. Woodward and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton.
12.

The Defendant replied to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition and made a

Cross-Motion for Si jmmaiv Disposition alleging as follow s 1) That the doctrine of res judicata did
not bar the modification; 2) That the Defendant was not guilty of latches nor is estopped from
asserting her claims; 3) That the Throckmorton v. Throckmorton case decided by the Court of
Appeals in 1988 was inapplicable to this case; 4) That thru1 has "kvii a substantial change in
circumstances; 5) That the statute of limitations does not apply to divorce proceedings in cases where
the court maintains niuiliihle powen. in am eel or equitably adjust divorce judgments; and 6) That
the trial court's Supplemental Decree evidenced a clear intent to divide all of the parties' assets on an
equal basis.
13/.

Each party replied to the memorandt i in > saliniilli il U\ flu ulhci parties and thevourt

having taken the matters into consideration, and having in court received statements of uncontested
facts by the parties as innffeis ol evidence to be admitted, and the court having reviewed the
memorandums of the parties and having orally indicated the court's decision to the parties, to which
the Defendant objected, Plaintiff submitted an Order, which Defendant objected to and the Court
having issued a Memorandum Decision, it
1.

I-I

heiehs I >RI)l-RI 1) and 41)11 T X J E D as follows:

That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
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10.

The Defendant filed a Petition for Modification of the Supplemental Decree on or

about October 23, 1995.
11.

The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the following issues: 1)

Whether or not the action brought by the Defendant is beyond the statutes of limitations; 2) Whether
or not the Defendant has waived or relinquished any claim she may have to the Plaintiffs military
retirement; 3) Whether or not the Defendant is entitled to a portion of the military retirement under
the decisions of Woodward v. Woodward and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton.
12.

The Defendant replied to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition and made a

Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition alleging as follows: 1) That the doctrine of res judicata did
not bar the modification; 2) That the Defendant was not guilty of latches nor is estopped from
asserting her claims; 3) That the Throckmorton v. Throckmorton case decided by the Court of
Appeals in 1988 was inapplicable to this case; 4) That there has been a substantial change in
circumstances; 5) That the statute of limitations does not apply to divorce proceedings in cases where
the court maintains equitable powers to correct or equitably adjust divorce judgments; and 6) That
the trial court's Supplemental Decree evidenced a clear intent to divide all of the parties' assets on an
equal basis.
13.

Each party replied to the memorandums submitted by the other parties, and the court

having taken the matters into consideration, and having in court received statements of uncontested
facts by the parties as proffers of evidence to be admitted, and the court having reviewed the
memorandums of the parties and having orally indicated the court's decision to the parties, to which
the Defendant objected, Plaintiff submitted an Order, which Defendant objected to and the Court
having issued a Memorandum Decision, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
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2.

I IMI Deli iiilant's Petition foi Moditir.itu n nil I In 1 Ms on e I )»eaee is hueb\ ilisinissed

with prejudice. Defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
3.

As a matter of law, the court has determined that the principles of latches and estoppel

are inappropn,-*
4.

"

r*e

The court, as a matter of law, determines that the action brought by the Defendant is

beyond the period of limitations Therefore, the Defendant is barred from bringing this action under
the provision of Title 78-12-22 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (As Amended)

The statute of limitations

begins to run from the time of the rendition and entry of the judgment in this case, which was on
Jul) (> P'hl of flu eftc ti\r date >t lb* I rdeial Mutton?) * I S m i t h s Spouse Profcctn n \ct on
February 1, 1983.
5.

The court further concludes that the rendition of the case of Woodward v. Woodward

on November '1 I'»K2 in*n ha\e given the Defendant a claim loi military benefits under the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act of September 8, 1982, with an effective date of
February 1, \{M\ uhu h was later made retroactive In I line 2,

1 >M Mm evci the court concludes

that the action brought by the Defendant was not within the eight year period of limitations for either
the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 6, 1981, nor the hearing for the division of
[Moperty held on tfit Inl\ ' I'WJ nor the enli\ ol the Supplemental Deciee on December 16, 1982
6.

The court furthers concludes that, as a matter of equity, the Defendant's filing of the

petition fourteen years and four months aftei the niti\ < >l tli< I *< « lee ot 1 >i\oice does not entitle tin
Defendant to relief from this court in the form of a Modification of the Decree of Divorce nor a
separate action in equity. The parties should be able to rely on a Decree of a Court, and for the same
reason 11 lal | nnupdJ* of equity ma* \m thisl\pei t nil HI tin

4

titutenl I imitation

ioes likewise

7.

The court concludes as a matter of law that there has been no change of circumstances

between the parties since the entry of the decree which would warrant a modification of the decree
and that the change of a substantial change in circumstances by the Defendant has not been shown
8

The court further concludes that the principals behind the doctrine of res judicata

affect this case The Court'sfindingsdo not mention military retiremenet and the absence of the
adjudication makes the doctrine of res judicata applicable to this case to the same extent as if the
retirement benefits were mentioned
9

The court concludes that the matter is res judicata, as the matter has been once

judicially decided and has been authoritatively andfinallysettled by the decision of a court, although
military retirement was not specifically addressed in the decree
10.

Each party shall pay their own costs of court and attorney's fees

DATED this^ffiday of c ^ x ^ W 4 ^ / \

^

, 1996.

District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMENDED
ORDER GRATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF to the Defendant's attorney,
Marlin Grant, OLSON & HOGGAN, 88 West Center, P O Box 525, Logan, UT 84323-0525 on this
[/"day of September, 1996
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